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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), on March 27, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case 
to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE DEFENDANT CUSTOM CRUSHING? (Issue preserved R. at 140-195, 216-223, 959-
998.) 
Standard of Review 
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the Court] 
review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. As such, "[the 
Court] considers] only whether [the trial court] correctly applied the law 
and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." 
[The Court] view[s] all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, ^ [13, 63 P.3d 705 (citations omitted). 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT MR. BETHERS HAD 
CONTINUING RIGHTS IN THE ORIGINAL LEASE AFTER IT WAS ASSIGNED TO CUSTOM 
CRUSHING? (Issue preserved R. at 158-163, 218-221, 416-422, 904-924.) 
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Standard of Review 
If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. 
Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, TJ12, 62 P.3d 440 (citations omitted). Additionally, 
whether a person is a party to a contract is a matter of contractual interpretation and may 
be interpreted as a matter of law. Id. ^[13. 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CUSTOM 
CRUSHING LEASE DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE ORIGINAL LEASE? (Issue preserved R. at 158-
163, 218-221, 416-422, 904-924.) 
Standard of Review 
"Since the issue of whether a contract [has been superseded] is a factual question, 
the trial court's determination will be sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence 
to support it." Ringwoodv. Foreign Autoworks, Inc, 671 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1983). 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT THE STATEMENTS OF THE 
PARTIES REGARDING A JOINT LITIGATION STRATEGY, IN AN EFFORT TO COMPROMISE 
CLAIMS AGAINST EACH OTHER, WERE NOT PROHIBITED BY RULE 408 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE? (Issue preserved R. at 603-607, 731-739, 741-744, 771-777, 855-859, 
868-869,873-874,881.) 
Standard of Review 
"[Wjhen [an] evidentiary ruling at issue is an independent legal issue and does not 
involve the balancing of factors, [the Courts] review the determination for correctness." 
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State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^21, 989 P.2d 52 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1222 n.22 (Utah 1993)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service 
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment 
in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and 
a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall 
be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to 
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party 
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah R. Evid. 408. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule 
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
4836-0240-9984 CU781010 A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is to review (1) an order denying cross motions for summary judgment 
dated September 5, 2001, entered by Judge Robert K. Hilder, Third District Court, (see R. 
at 228-229, a copy of the order is appended to this Brief as Exhibit A), and (2) the 
judgment entered on January 7, 2003, entered by Judge Robert K. Hilder, Third District 
Court, (see R. at 528-531, a copy of the judgment is appended to this Brief as Exhibit B). 
IL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On February 10, 2000, Don Fitzgerald, Norma Fitzgerald, Steven Fitzgerald, and 
Cloverleaf Ranch, L.C. (hereinafter "the Fitzgeralds") filed a Complaint against Ray 
Bethers and Custom Crushing, Inc. (See R. at 1-38.) The Complaint sought to quiet title 
in certain property, a declaratory judgment, and damages for claims related to a gravel pit 
owned by the Fitzgeralds and leased to Custom Crushing. (See id.) Bethers answered the 
complaint and filed a cross-claim against Custom Crushing. (See R. at 52-65.) Custom 
Crushing answered the Fitzgeralds' claim (see R. at 46-51), and filed a cross-claim 
against Bethers. (see R. at 60-77.) ] 
On May 21, 2001, the Fitzgeralds filed a motion for summary judgment. (See R. 
at 91-139.) In answer, Custom Crushing also filed a motion for summary judgment. (See 
R. at 140-195.) After a hearing on the motion, the Court entered an order denying the 
1
 The Fitzgeralds were permitted to amend their complaint, which they did on March 13, 
2002. (See R. at 330-339.) On March 18, 2002, Custom Crushing answered the 
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cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Ex. A.) 
A bench trial was held on July 9, 10, and 11, 2002. At the conclusion of the trial, 
the Court gave its oral decision ruling in favor of the Fitzgeralds in all material respects. 
(See R. at 945-955.) On October 25, 2002, the Court entered its Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law (Findings and Conclusions). (See R. at 439-447. A copy of the 
Findings and Conclusions is appended as Exhibit C.) On January 6, 2003, the Court 
entered its Judgment and Order. (See Ex. B.) Custom Crushing filed its Notice of 
Appeal on February 5, 2003. (A copy of the Notice of Appeal is appended as Exhibit D.) 
III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In 1986, the Fitzgeralds entered into a document designated as "Option for 
Purchase of Sand and Gravel" (Original Lease) with L. Clifton Read. (See Ex. C, f^ 2; 
Trial Exhibit P-l. A copy of the Original Lease is appended to this Brief as Exhibit E.) 
The Original Lease gave Read the exclusive right to purchase sand, gravel, and road and 
dam building materials from property owned by the Fitzgeralds (the Property). (See Ex. 
C, |^ 2; Ex. E at 1.) It originally was to run for a term from February 6, 1986 to February 
6, 1992. (See Ex. E at 1; Ex C, ^ 3.) The Original Lease also gave Read the option to 
extend the term of the Original Lease for two additional five-year terms. (See Ex. E at 1; 
Ex C, Tf 3.) Accordingly, the first option period ran from February 6, 1992 to February 6, 
1997, and the second option period ran from February 6, 1997 to February 6, 2002. 
Read assigned his rights in the Original Lease to Ray Bethers in 1991 by a 
Amended Complaint. (See R. at 340-350.) 
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document entitled Purchase and Broker Agreement (Read/Bethers Assignment). (Ex. C, 
Tf 6; Trial Exhibit P-2. A copy is appended to this Brief as Exhibit F.) Bethers exercised 
his option to extend the term of the Original Lease for the first option period. (See R. at 
587-88, 660; Trial Exhibit P-3; Ex. C, f 7.) 
During the period that Read and Bethers held the rights to the property under the 
Original Lease, the Fitzgeralds received little, if any, royalty payments. (See R. at 585-
87, 612-13.) In fact, although Read did extract rock and sell it during his time as lessee, 
Bethers did no additional extraction and sold only the stockpiled Materials left there by 
Read. (See R. at 587, 659, 672-73.) 
In 1994, Custom Crushing approached the Fitzgeralds about the possibility of 
leasing the Property and beginning a commercial gravel pit operation at the site if 
necessary governmental approvals could be obtained. (See R. at 588, 618-21, 780.) The 
Fitzgeralds approved of the idea and told Custom Crushing they were agreeable to such 
an arrangement. (See R. at 588-89, 618-21, 780-81.) Based upon their statements, 
Custom Crushing began the expensive process of getting the necessary governmental 
approvals. (See R. at 589-90, 618-21, 782-83.) Custom Crushing paid for all of the 
expenses, totaling approximately $138,000, including attorney and expert fees, for 
approval of the annexation of the property into the Town of Francis and the approval of a 
conditional use permit. (See R. at 589-90, 618-21, 783-84.) Additionally, Custom 
Crushing paid for all of the expenses, totaling approximately $60,000, for the litigation 
and costs arising out of those approvals. (See R. at 589-90, 790-91.) 
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After the annexation and conditional use permit applications had been approved, 
Bethers began to assert his interest in the Property. (See R. at 623, 662-63, 786-87.) At 
that time, despite Custom Crushing's expenditure of significant resources, Custom 
Crushing still had no formal written agreement with the Fitzgeralds giving it any rights in 
the Property. (See R. at 622, 783.) The Fitzgeralds assured Custom Crushing that they 
could make satisfactory arrangements with Bethers to get him to relinquish his interest in 
the Property. (See R. at 623, 786-87.) However, when negotiations failed between the 
Fitzgeralds and Bethers, Custom Crushing took an active role in securing Bethers' rights. 
(See R. at 787.) 
In May 1995, Bethers assigned his rights in the Original Lease to Custom 
Crushing in a document entitled Assignment of Option (Custom Crushing Assignment). 
(See Ex. C, ^ 8; R. at 591; 663-64, 787; Trial Exhibit P-4. A copy of the Custom 
Crushing Assignment is appended to this Brief as Exhibit G.) The Custom Crushing 
Assignment provided in part that Bethers was entitled to a royalty of $.20 per ton of 
material extracted during "the term of 'The [Original Lease],'" payable in material only, 
with the right to payment expiring one year after the royalty accrued. (See Ex. C, f 10; R. 
at 664-65, 787-89; Ex. G, ffl[ 1-2.) Additionally, the Custom Crushing Assignment 
provided that Bethers was required to pay the outstanding balance due and owing MCM 
Engineering for certain services it had performed when Bethers had sought but had failed 
to receive land use approval from the County. (See R. at 818; Ex. G, ^ 7.) 
In June 1995, one month after Custom Crushing succeeded to Read's and Bethers' 
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interests. Custom Crushing entered into a docnnn m rr.ti.'ii. ••' •' • >se Agreement w ith the 
Fit/gcralili, !•'hsioin i'lushing Lease). (See Ex C, \ 14;R. ati*'* |;» ln.il rxtiilhi I 
A copy of the Custom - . . . • , appenued to the Brief as Exhibit H » Whili m-i 
exp.i^.»lv mentioning the original Lea--j .o. ;OL I case gau, Custom 
Crush , _ .
 M4nie rights granted in the Ordinal Led-; ;,^ing was 
given Hit '"exclusive UL'I pusscssioii ol and removal of sand, gravel, and ofhci "'tvk 
product . from the Property." f!w owever, to make the 
w.r * . • ' \ • = *iiiiwuii> icasible and allow Custom Crushin ' • . money 
expended ^'. ii lor go\r - * approvals, the Custom Crushing Lease fj:sve CIP.IOIH 
Crushing the right to remove material fn . T,inc ?0h^—three years 
longer than the final da\ of the second option period in the Original Lease \ K al ^v^C) , 
Ex. II )\ i.) Additionally ih«« ' fusioni Crushing Lease provided that the FitzecraK- - -
entitled to a twenty-six cent per ton royalty' mihi sm h lime as Custom Crushing [was] no 
longei ohh^aieu 10 provide compensation to Ray Bethers. ":I1 -»_. t \ 1L 
';; [, L\ . C, % lo i 11^' '^ Hi''-six cent royalty, however, was not to be nan I >" n -, 
product taken b> Ka\ Bethr i pavment akicr he v usiom *: rushing 
Assip i J A M * Mthou&h the Fit/ueraid agreed to 
accept twenty-five cci. ai\ tindei ihe Custom Crushing Lease, the 
Fitzgeralds requested a one cent increase n f(. u^ \i ^ * n'k.- .JI, .n ana of 
nivalin rs lo compensate them for the amounts removed * the 
Custom Crushing \<<v: N-'-OO. 793-94: Ex L, *
 w Ai the 
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Custom Crushing was no longer obligated to Ray Bethers, the Fitzgeralds were to be 
entitled to a heightened royalty of $.50 per ton. {See R. at 641-42, 794; Ex. H, 1f 1; Ex. C, 
116.) 
After the execution of the Custom Crushing Lease, the Fitzgeralds and Custom 
Crushing performed pursuant to the terms of the Custom Crushing Lease, not the terms of 
the Original Lease. Custom Crushing paid the $.26 per ton royalty found in the Custom 
Crushing Lease to the Fitzgeralds. {See Ex. C, If 25; R. at 607-11, 800; Trial Exhibits P-
7, P-8, P-9.) Custom Crushing also delivered material to Ray Bethers pursuant to the 
Custom Crushing Assignment. {See R. at 674-681, 801-09, 818-26, 834; Trial Exhibits 
D-30, D-31, D-32, D-33; Ex. C, If 28.) Surprisingly however, in February of 1997, the 
Fitzgeralds came to Custom Crushing and insisted that because they had not received a 
written notice to extend the Original Lease, Ray Bethers' rights to receive any additional 
royalties had ceased. {See R. at 599-600, 604-05, 800-01.) Accordingly, they asserted 
that Custom Crushing was no longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers. 
{See R. at 599-600, 604-05, 737, 800-01, 855.) They, therefore, demanded that Custom 
Crushing pay them the heightened royalty of $.50 per ton. {See R. at 599-600, 604-05, 
737, 800-01, 855.) At the same time, Bethers continued to demand that he receive 
payment of his material royalty. {See R. at 599-600, 604-05, 737, 800-01, 855.) In fact, 
Bethers continued to receive materials in payment of his royalty after February 1997. 
Despite Bethers agreement in the Custom Crushing Assignment, Bethers had 
failed to pay the bill owing to MCM Engineering. {See R. at 674-681, 801-09, 818-26, 
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;- -- . rial Lxnibits D-30, D-31, D-32, D-3.; : .: . ^ci ing made demand 
up—1, '. r.mg to pay the amounts owing and uae e • •- °* 
6 7 4 - 8 1 , 818-26, I rial EvhiW response, Custom Crushing brokered a 
which ; vk M Engineer ing and Bethers agreed ili.ii hei ei * was to sell a portion e-i nis 
m a v l iver, Rycr was to pax Bethers for the ; Ked-up, and 
Bethers was to r o \ ' • .., ^. . ^ R. at 6""-81. 821-22; Trial L ^ b - ) 
However, after tne first iiiuui. uiiuci " : -. ;,i,^w
 t * pa}' MCM bngineering 
x . i* at 822-23.) Consequently H\a b: »•- ;jg tne check to 
Custom ( rushr- enver the amount to MCM Engineeims; 
677 HI, 822-23.) Despite this agreeme .:,;g also paid MCM Engineering 
ai l - . . ccuic me account i vc R. at 823-2^ 1;\ "< ,n\,llK) 
s„ ^amur- *v gerau> \u^% this aclior against Ray Bethers anil Ciuioin 
Crushing. Although Bethers filed an a; *.-. ained against Custom Crushing. 
..hers assigned his rights in his material ••••i-.! .. - in ihh, 
litigation ^ me i itzgeniii^ < i i! at 611-12; 685-88. i':a, Exhibit 
^'t^crcralds sough! the lohuwinji relic( in iL, n nended K -*.~ir-air' * • w ^ 
/ property in favor of the FitzgeraitE * ^.jring \\\<x\ the 
Dniiinal Lease has e\r-- ' <ni i < mill and \oid; (?) damages for the difference i 
the $.26 royalty paid and the $.50 royally \\w y claim i: i owed Irom February 6, 1997 to 
the n».^.- .amagcb lor failure 10 provide Bethers his rovalu .mil ,m mounting: and 
*'\i damages w nv •' -•»<* fc"reosonable value of the benefit r^ 
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Custom Crushing." (See R. at 330-339.) Custom Crushing answered and filed a cross 
claim against Bethers asserting it be paid damages for Bethers' failure to remove the 
scales and for the Custom Crushing payments to MCM Engineering. 
In August of 2001, the Fitzgeralds and Custom Crushing filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Although the critical facts were undisputed, the trial court refused to 
grant summary judgment, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact. 
(See Ex. A.) 
The matter was set for trial on July 9, 2002. During the course of the three-day 
bench trial, the Plaintiffs offered testimony by Norma Fitzgerald and by Sheldon Smith, 
former attorney for the Fitzgeralds, regarding discussions that the Fitzgeralds and Custom 
Crushing had had after the Fitzgeralds had indicated their intention to make claim on 
Custom Crushing for additional royalties. (See R. at 603-607, 731-739, 741-744, 771-
777, 855-859, 868-869, 873-874, 881.) The discussions related to a joint litigation 
strategy that the Fitzgeralds and Custom Crushing might pursue in order to settle or 
compromise the claims that the parties had against each other. (See id.) Custom Crushing 
objected to the testimony as it was precluded by Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(See id.) The Court overruled the objections and allowed the evidence in. (See id..) 
On October 25, 2002, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (Findings & Conclusions, Ex. C.) The Findings and Conclusions provided in 
relevant part: 
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FINDINGS iW ¥A( 1 
ll> During the negotiation H the lease Agreement, Plaintiffs and 
Custom Crushing agreed that it Belhers pro\ided written notice to (In; 
Piiitniifts prior to I;ebruary 6, 19^7 to exercise the last option period, tin; 
l'i)ngin;il lease) and compensation to BetliiT% ^nnid In- extended lo 
l-chnuir • fi ?()(): 
22. During the years of 1997 uj. .o _v.^  t. \ ustom Crushing and Plaintiffs 
worked together to determine the rights, if am <*^  Bethers to compensation 
under the 1986 Agreement. 
23. 1 ;:.. rvv^. v. iaig i. , ." counsel lo Custom Crushing, drafted a 
Complaint naming CiM-'* RA\ Betheis a<* defendants 
seeking quiet title ana u, u^i_._ s - deierndne the rights, if 
any. of Bethers 
.,N ,, .uiv i^w. L.raig Smith, counsel to Custom Crushing, prepared a 
contingency fee agreement wherein Craig Smith's firm and Sheldon Smith, 
counsel i. I uintiffs, would share a ten cents per ton ro\ah> from "the dair 
iu Court determines the [1986] terminated and Mr. Bethers is UM eniuvii 
to royalt}. .:;s: !-.m through February 6, 2002. the last date the lOrigma 
Lease] and all options would expire if all required notn*^ ^-i Wvr ai\en 
CONCLUSION- i)i L ^ 
1. Under the express terms of the [Original 1 CU^ L :-L agreement 
would terminate on 5-Vbryan 6. 1W" »• the last option vvab iiui , v^rrised *^y 
Bethers. 
2. The last option contained in the »^  >i i^mai Lease] which would have 
extended the term to February 6, 2002 was not exercised, 
3. \v HiK-.a. me required notice to exercise, the [Original Lease] expired 
under its ov • vmw *-*- i-hruarv 6. ]°0^, and thereafter had no legal force 
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or effect. 
Based upon those findings and conclusions, on January 6, 2003, the Court entered a 
judgment against Custom Crushing in the sum of $502,239.05. (See Ex. B.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly denied Custom Crushing's summary judgment. The 
trial court incorrectly concluded that the Original Lease was not superseded by the 
Custom Crushing Lease. Instead, the court concluded that there was an issue of fact 
when it accepted the Fitzgeralds' mistaken notion that the Original Lease survived the 
Custom Crushing Lease and that the obligation to Bethers' term depended upon Bethers 
exercise of an option he did not have. 
At trial, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Bethers had a continuing right to 
exercise the option after the entry of the Custom Crushing Lease. As a matter of law, all 
rights in the Original Lease had passed to Custom Crushing in the Custom Crushing 
Assignment leaving Bethers with no rights. The trial court's incorrect conclusion 
undermined its remaining findings and conclusions and should, therefore, be reversed. 
The trial court also clearly erred when it determined that the Custom Crushing 
Lease did not supersede the Original Lease. The principles of contractual interpretation 
make clear that courts must first review the plain language of an agreement to determine 
the parties' intentions. Only if the language is susceptible to reasonable alternative 
interpretations can the Court review extrinsic evidence. In this case, the contracts were 
not ambiguous about the parties' intentions with regard to the Custom Crushing Lease. It 
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>\i\s Jearlv intended to supersede the Origin;!1 ' .- < .urdingly, It was incorrect for 
ilic u"«:i'i mi I ii'ly on extrinsic evidence t - d. amine that the Original i AML%C survived. 
Because the Custom Crushing f •*•*• ^ ; ^ u a . die Original I .ease, the obligatior 
necessary to extend the Original Lease—u i [ .*,*. .u ne. Additionally. Bethers 
did not have anv I'lt'lu 10 extend the Original Option since lie ha ; .- - • -• us away 
in the Original Lease. 
Finally, the trial court incorrectly permitted evidence to be presented to the trier of 
iaei H' ilis,ryssnni't and documents derived from settlement iu . »• • « •„ JiM.ussions 
and documents, howew- :ved alter a dispute arose, and while the i •
 t :-\ UIMV-
attempting to resolve that dispute, im ^a.^  substantial and prejudicial 
as *' ' -.pecilicady relied upon this improperly admits - * Ending 
as to Custom Crushing intent when it entered the Custom Crushing Lease. 
I. 1 HE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY < 'ONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDINC; TIIL ENTRY OF SUMMARY IIIIIC.MFNT 
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT CUSTOM CRUSHING 
A motion toi suniman judgmen.- .. . .iJ he gunned onl\ when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the Court] 
review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. As such, "[the 
Court] considers] only whether [the trial court] correctly applied the law 
and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." 
[The Court] view[s] all facts and reasonable inferences draw*: therefrom i-i 
the light most favorable to the non-mo\ine nam 
Lovendahl * ' , Jrn /, 2002 ITT
 : Ml « 13, 63 l\3d 705 -vn 
4836-0?4n.<mw 1 15 
In this case, prior to trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The sole argument on the summary judgment motions was whether Custom Crushing's 
obligation to provide compensation to Bethers under the Custom Crushing Assignment 
terminated when neither Bethers nor Custom Crushing extended the term of the Original 
Lease. (See R. at 106; 206-07.) 
In order for the Court to understand the relevant arguments, a more thorough 
explanation of the documents at issue in this case is necessary. As described above, the 
Fitzgeralds agreed in the Custom Crushing Lease to a twenty-six cent per ton royalty on 
materials "produced and sold on the Property until such time as Custom Crushing is no 
longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers." (Ex. H, ^ 1.) Once Custom 
Crushing was no longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers, the royalty to 
the Fitzgeralds was to increase to fifty cents per ton. Obviously, because the Custom 
Crushing Lease tied the enhanced royalty payments to Custom Crushing's obligation to 
provide compensation to Bethers, the Court was required to look to the Custom Crushing 
Assignment, which defines Custom Crushing's obligation. 
The Custom Crushing Assignment declares that Bethers is to receive his royalty 
"during the term of 'The [Original Lease]." (Ex. G, U 2.) As discussed above, the 
Original Lease had a six year term with two option periods. (See Ex. E at 1.) The 
various time periods created by the Original Lease can be represented as follows: 
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1 7 0 0 
Feb. Feb, • !.!> 
1 9 9 2 (I st Option Period) 1 9 9 7 (2nd Optioi i «'"•«< «\ '""< H \ 
At the a 
first option period, which was sc 
Crushing Assignment, the Original Leav ux, m in 
. vivti ' . " . I ^ t ' ^ V _ ; i>b; 
V Ex C c ' t »K month allci mg Assignment 
was entered, uustc „ ai.j iiiw i -izeeralds entered the Custom Cm* 
(See Ex, C, j^ 14; R. at 594-95; Ex 11 i i hr ii,-l;,iiit»it%hipN of the various agreements can 
V • * i . ^d l i eU Li dpi sic ally as follows: 
Feb. 
1986 
»eb . i d i . Feb . 
it Option I'. li.i.Ji ll>*> unJ Option Period' ?S)(\. 
plight to Extract: ^^^^^^^^^^¥ft $,25 per tan 
Original : T ease 
May 1995 
Custom Crushing Assignment 
June 1995 
llUliii 
Custom. Crushing Lease 
'iwiiiiilffiimiimiii 
June 
2UU5 
I "In, question, presented in this case was wheidi • ihr .*. he Custom 
Crushing Assi'jiv "nstom Crushing was to pa> the ro\ ah i 
the termination of the Original Lease (a! ;un inih11, u' ) until the last day of the first option 
F til the last day of the last option peri 
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The undisputed evidence presented with the summary judgment motions 
established that the parties intended that the last day of the last option period, February 6, 
2002, was the intended end of the term if the second option of the Original Lease were 
exercised. (See R. at 203.) The Fitzgeralds were clear: "There is no dispute that the 
royalties to be paid to Bethers pursuant to the Custom Crushing Assignment would 
continue through February 6, 2002, provided that the [second] option was exercised to 
extend the [Original Lease] through that date." (Id.) Their sole argument was that "the 
[second] option was never exercised." (Id.) The Fitzgerald's argument that the second 
"option was never exercised" hinged on their mistaken belief that the Original Lease 
"providfed] that in order to exercise any of the options to extend the term of [the Original 
Lease], it is required that notice be given to the Fitzgeralds in writing and prior to the 
expiration of the prior option period." (R. at 206-07.) Because they claimed no such 
notice had been given, they argued that the Original Lease was not extended and, 
therefore, terminated on February 6, 1997. Hence, they concluded, Custom Crushing was 
no longer obligated to pay Bethers the royalty. 
This argument, however, fails as a matter of law. There was no dispute that the 
Custom Crushing Assignment gave Custom Crushing all of Bethers5 rights in the 
Original Lease. (See Ex. G, Recitals ^ C; Ex. G, ^ 1.) Under the Original Lease, the 
Fitzgeralds offered to extend the exclusive right to purchase sand, gravel, and building 
materials from February 6, 1997, to February 6, 2002, if Custom Crushing, as Read's and 
Bether's successor-in-interest, would, by written notice, exercise the option before 
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- U M U J '. : " 'See Ex 1: j . .., ^U. I J ^ecessor- in- interest gave 
c o n s u l • u promise. Accordingly, the Original I VA ;e i lot • :: i :il> ga/\ e Ci istom 
Crushing a iease interns: ,. ajso gave cus tom Crushing an optioi i to 
extend the lease, See Coulter & Smith, Ltd i • R u M se n t , 966 I 2d 852, 859 (Utah 1998) 
° continuing offer, supported b> coi isidei atioi l ^ \ Iiich the 
promisor is bound iu K - i^  case,, the optioi l contained tw o contuicluai 
. . . u u o n ^ / t x ilie Fif/geraids were ol r\iu\u * . opei l tlieii offer to lease the 
]>•" * > . Mailing f a '!, ; iod February 1997 to I ebr \- -• . nt:I 
Februar} 199/ , anu fi l ing was obligated to provide written i > 
accept the offci 
i . ., . ;„ . . a rg - r the Original Lease vvaa nv :*utu v rh' 
provided Uieiii wi.- * .ep; tin uiier to exiend the Original Lea ^ 
second option period. . ..^, xiowew
 v a - i nose two contractual 
....u.gcu when !hc Fitzgerald^ aiiw (Juston .j:> . .^ie* ,. . - *u; 
* iMu:i; Crushing ' .-i uumauc that a contractual dut\ is discharge ' h 
*. *i suHtituted comra. ,nun v. (t* ••>• */ , i (nan t I. Apn l*x ; 
flioldn i-ii *»l a contract which is accepted by the obli?* .» . J , ; . ;. >. ihe 
original duty discharge* 
In this case, there was a substituu *:• /wi.aigcd Custom. Crushing's 
duly to J : • : • y / r it • * v i ittei I i lotice to extend the Original Lease. \ cc i iti a ::t Is sij.bstltii.ted for 
another when it "incorpoi ales all : i pai t ^ an earlier agreement."" Ringwood} >" F i >/ c ngn 
4836-0240-9984 .CI J78I.OJO 
Autoworks, Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 183 n.2 (Utah 1983). In this case, it is clear that the 
Custom Crushing Lease substituted for the Original Lease. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 279 provides the following illustration which is particularly relevant to this 
case. 
2. A and B make a contract under which A promises to build on a 
designated spot a building, for which B promises to pay $100,000. Later, 
before this contract is performed, A and B make a new contract under 
which A is to build on the same spot a different building for which B is to 
pay $200,000. The new contract is a substituted contract and the duties of 
A and B under the original contract are discharged.2 
This case is analogous. The undisputed evidence showed that the Fitzgeralds 
promised in the Original Lease to provide material from certain property to Custom 
Crushing, as a successor-in-interest to Read, at a certain royalty rate from February 6, 
1997 to February 6, 2002, if Custom Crushing provided written notice of its intent to 
accept the offer before February 6, 1997. (See R. at 150; 203.) Before the Fitzgeralds' 
offer was accepted, the parties entered into a lease in which the Fitzgeralds agreed to 
provide the same materials from the same property specified in the Original Lease. (Ex. 
E. at 1; Ex. G, Recitals fflj A, W; Ex. G ^ 1.) However, the Fitzgeralds agreed to a longer 
term and asked for a higher royalty rate for the exact same material they were obligated 
to supply under the Original Lease. (Ex. E at 2; Ex. G, If 1.) After the entry of the 
Custom Crushing Lease, it is undisputed that the Fitzgeralds received the twenty-six cent 
2
 This Court has explicitly relied upon section 279 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts in deciding other cases. See Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1350-51 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987). 
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royalty payment under the Custom Crushing Lease and the parties performed pursuant to 
that agreement. (See R. at 975 ("The third critical fact is that after the lease agreement 
was entered, the Fitzgeralds only received the royalty provided for under the lease 
agreement, not the original option); R. at 992 ("I think it was that only, that the 
Fitzgeralds only received the payment under the lease. They didn't receive it under the 
option. There's no question about that—").) 
The Fitzgeralds, therefore, cannot dispute that the Custom Crushing Lease 
substituted for the Original Lease. Hence, as a matter of law, Custom Crushing's 
contractual obligation to provide written notice to extend the lease was discharged. 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding "substitution of a 
contract which is accepted by the obligee in satisfaction of the original duty discharges 
the original duty"). There was no longer an obligation to provide written notice to extend 
the Original Lease. 
As a result of these dispositive legal and factual issues, Custom Crushing was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that its obligation to Bethers continued. As 
described above, all the parties agreed that if Custom Crushing had exercised its right to 
extend the Original Lease through the second option period, Custom Crushing's 
obligation to pay Bethers the royalty would have continued. (See R. at 203 ("There is no 
dispute that the royalties to be paid to Bethers pursuant to the Custom Crushing 
Assignment would continue through February 6, 2002, provided that the [second] option 
was exercised to extend the [Original Lease] through that date.") The Fitzgeralds' sole 
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argument was that "the [second] option was never exercised," (id), because notice had 
not been given "to the Fitzgeralds in writing," (id. at 207.) Fitzgeralds made this 
argument very clearly in the hearing on the motions for summary judgment: 
THE COURT: I think that's undisputed. The argument is that the lease 
agreement really substituted for or took the place of the option so it would 
have been a futile act. I mean I think that's why we're here and so I mean, 
it is not disputed there was no formal renewal of the option or exercise of 
the option, it is disputed that there was in fact a continuing agreement to 
take the gravel, etc. Do you agree with that? 
MR. SMITH: I agree with that, I think that is the dispute that's before the 
Court and I will just move - from the fact, it sounds like the Court has a 
handle on the facts. It does come down to the issue of whether the lease 
really did exercise the option to extend the option agreement...." 
(R. at 963.) As a matter of law, entering the substituted contract discharged Custom 
Crushing of providing the written notice and extended the terms of the Original Lease 
through 2005. By entering into the Custom Crushing Lease that provided Custom 
Crushing with access to the property for an additional three years, Custom Crushing 
accepted the offer to extend the Original Lease through the second option period. Thus, 
although the Original Lease was superseded by the Custom Crushing Lease—hence, 
eliminating the need to provide notice of extension—Custom Crushing's obligation to 
Ray Bethers did not terminate—Custom Crushing had extended its rights to the 
Fitzgeralds' property past February 6, 1997, the expiration of the first option period of the 
Original Lease. Accordingly, Custom Crushing's obligation to Mr. Bethers did terminate 
on February 6, 1997, but continued until at least February 6, 2002. 
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Given these undisputed material facts and the law, the trial court incorrectly 
denied the motion for summary judgment for Custom Crushing. Custom Crushing 
therefore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denial of the motion for 
summary judgment and remand to the trial court for an entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Custom Crushing. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. BETHERS HAD 
CONTINUING RIGHTS IN THE ORIGINAL LEASE AFTER IT WAS ASSIGNED TO 
CUSTOM CRUSHING 
Even if the trial court were not incorrect in refusing to grant summary judgment, 
the trial court also made several reversible errors during the course of the three-day trial. 
The first and most significant was that it incorrectly concluded that Mr. Bethers had 
continuing rights in the Original Lease after it was assigned to Custom Crushing. 
Utah law provides that "[a]n assignment is the transfer of rights" from one party to 
another. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). An assignment is 
simply a contract that 
is interpreted according to the rules of contract construction. If the contract 
is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties 
must be determined from the words of the agreement. A court may only 
consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract 
language is ambiguous or uncertain. A contract provision is ambiguous if it 
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of "uncertain 
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Whether 
ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. 
Id at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) 
(other citations omitted)). Additionally, "[tjhere is a presumption that a lease has 
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been assigned, when there is a person other than the lessee in possession of the 
leased premises, who is paying rent to the lessor." Jensen v. O.K. Investment 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 235, 507 P.2d 713, 716 (1973). 
In this case, the trial court determined that the Fitzgeralds were entitled to the 
heightened royalties beginning February 6, 1997, based solely on its determination that 
Bethers did not exercise the right to extend the Original Lease into the second option 
period. The conclusions of the trial court are explicit. 
1. Under the express terms of the [Original Lease], the agreement 
would terminate on February 6, 1997 if the last option was not exercised by 
Bethers. 
2. The last option contained in the [Original Lease] which would have 
extended the term to February 6, 2002 was not exercised. 
3. Without the required notice to exercise, the [Original Lease] expired 
under its own terms on February 6, 1997, and thereafter had no legal force 
or effect. 
{See Ex. C, R. at 443-44 (emphasis added).) 
These conclusions imply certain findings: (1) that the Original Lease survived the 
Custom Crushing Lease and (2) that Bethers still had a continuing right in the Original 
Lease to extend the Original Lease into the second option period. However, as discussed 
above in part I, and as will be more thoroughly discussed in part III below, the Original 
Lease did not survive the Custom Crushing Lease. Even if it had survived, the trial court 
incorrectly concluded that Bethers had continuing rights in the Original Lease. 
The Custom Crushing Assignment stated that Bethers "desire[d] to assign all of 
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his rights to the Property under the '[Original Lease]' to Custom Crushing, and Custom 
Crushing desire[d] to accept such assignment." (Ex. G, Recitals C.) Consequently, the 
agreement provided that Bethers "forever assignfed] to Custom Crushing all right, title 
and interest in and to the Property and to all sand, gravel, aggregate or other rock or earth 
products produced on or from the Property." (Ex. G f^ 1.) Additionally, the agreement 
provided that "Bethers shall have no right to operate any sand and gravel operation on the 
Property, and has expressly assigned any such right to Custom Crushing." (Ex. G f^ 8.) 
Thus, the plain language of the terms of the Custom Crushing Assignment provided that 
all rights under the Original Lease were assigned to Custom Crushing.3 
There is no question that the unambiguous language of the contract provides that 
Ray Bethers had passed all of his rights in the Original Lease to Custom Crushing. 
Additionally, the undisputed evidence at trial was that Custom Crushing paid the 
royalties from the time of its entry on the land, establishing the presumption that Custom 
Crushing had been assigned the lease. (R. at 607-09, 796-800; Trial Ex. P-7; D-41.) As 
a matter of law, therefore, Bethers had assigned the entire contract to Custom Crushing. 
Because Bethers had assigned the Original Lease, the option to renew was 
3
 All parties who testified at trial agreed. Norma Fitzgerald very clearly understood that 
once Bethers and Custom Crushing entered into the Custom Crushing Assignment, 
Custom Crushing had all the rights under the Original Lease. (See R. at 595, 630-36.) 
Bethers understood that he was simply assigning the Original Lease to Custom Crushing. 
(See R. at 664.) Sheldon Smith, attorney for the Fitzgeralds, understood that the Custom 
Crushing Assignment gave Custom Crushing the rights Bethers had in the Original 
Lease. (See R. at 723-724.) Steve Zabriskie, president of Custom Crushing, understood 
that Custom Crushing was receiving Bethers' rights in the Original Lease. (See R. at 
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transferred to Custom Crushing with all of its attending benefits and burdens. 
A provision in a lease giving the lessee the option to extend or renew the 
lease creates only a contractual right. It does not transfer any interest in the 
land until the option is exercised. However, when the option is exercised 
the covenant to renew ceases to be merely personal and runs with the land. 
The legal successors of the lessee as well as of the lessor are entitled to 
the benefits, and, are burdened with the duties and obligations, which 
the covenant conferred and imposed on the original parties. 
Jensen, 29 Utah 2d at 236, 507 P.2d at 716 (quoting Cicinelli v. Twasaki, 170 Cal. App. 
2d 58, 338 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1959) (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
Bethers no longer had a right to exercise the option, because it had passed to Custom 
Crushing. "One of the most basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, only 
parties to the contract may enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract." 
Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, ^13, 62 P.3d 440. 
The trial court, thus, incorrectly concluded that "[u]nder the express terms of the 
[Original Lease], the agreement would terminate on February 6, 1997 if the last option 
was not exercised by Bethers." (Ex. C, R. at 443.) Bethers could not have exercised the 
option since he was no longer a party to the Original Lease. 
This incorrect conclusion undermined the trial court's remaining conclusions and 
judgments. As indicated in the language of the Conclusions of Law, the remaining 
conclusions, and ultimately the judgment, were premised entirely on the trial court's 
conclusion that Bethers had failed to exercise the second option under the Original Lease. 
The third and fourth conclusions of law determined that because the option had not been 
787-88.) 
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exercised in writing by Bethers, "the [Original Lease] expired under its own terms on 
February 6, 1997, and thereafter had no legal force or effect." (Ex. C, R. at 444.) 
Consequently, the trial court held that "[a]fter February 6, 1997, Custom Crushing was no 
longer obligated to provide compensation to Bethers." (Id.) 
Given that Bethers had assigned his rights in the Original Lease to Custom 
Crushing, however, Bethers had neither the right nor the power to extend the option. 
Therefore, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the Original Lease could only be 
extended by written notice from Bethers. Accordingly, Custom Crushing respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of 
Custom Crushing. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CUSTOM 
CRUSHING LEASE DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE ORIGINAL LEASE 
As discussed above, the second implicit ruling found in the trial court's 
conclusions of law is that the Original Lease survived the entry of the Custom Crushing 
Lease. The language found in paragraph 19 of the Findings of Fact supports this 
understanding of the trial court's conclusions. 
19. During the negotiation of the Lease Agreement, Plaintiffs and 
Custom Crushing agreed that if Bethers provided written notice to the 
Plaintiffs prior to February 6, 1997 to exercise the last option period, the 
[Original Lease] and compensation to Bethers would be extended to 
February 6, 2002. 
(Ex. C, R. at 442.) In other words, the trial court found that the parties did not intend to 
supersede the Original Lease with the Custom Crushing Lease, that the Original Lease 
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still survived the Custom Crushing Lease, and that Bethers had a continuing interest in 
the Original Lease that could only be extended by submission of a written notice. 
"Since the issue of whether a contract [has been superseded] is a factual question, 
the trial court's determination will be sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence 
to support it." Ringwoodv. Foreign Autoworks, Inc, 671 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1983). A 
finding that is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence is not 
supported by substantial evidence. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). 
A. The Evidence 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Custom 
Crushing marshals the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the Custom 
Crushing Lease did not supersede the Original Lease. 
The following evidence was adduced that could be construed to support the trial 
court's findings. First, two witnesses, Norma Fitzgerald and Sheldon Smith, testified that 
certain statements were made during the negotiations of the Custom Crushing Lease. The 
witnesses testified that during the negotiations of the Custom Crushing Lease, Custom 
Crushing expressed that it wanted a new lease agreement to give it the right to lease the 
property through 2005 in the event that the Original Lease agreement was not extended 
into the second option period. {See R. at 595-96 ("He wanted this (inaudible) through 
what the—if the option was not renewed at that time, then he needed it to covered with 
this."); R. at 636-38, 724-25.) Additionally, they stated that the intent of entering into the 
Custom Crushing Lease was to give Custom Crushing three more years to lease the 
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property beyond the last date of the end of the second option period found in the Original 
Lease. (See R. at 595 ("[T]here was still a period of time that he didn't have a contract so 
he wanted this to fill in for when this [expired]."); R. at 636-38, 724-25.) They also 
testified that Custom Crushing had said that the Original Lease would not be extended if 
Ray Bethers did not extend the option. (See R. at 597, 643, 726.) The witnesses further 
testified that Custom Crushing had stated that it would not renew the term on the Original 
Lease to extend it into the second option period. (See R. at 596-97; 726.) Also, the 
witnesses testified that Custom Crushing said that it would rather pay the Fitzgeralds than 
Ray Bethers. (See R. at 597, 725.) Accordingly, the witnesses testified that they 
understood that the agreement provided that "[w]hen Ray Bethers was no longer in and if 
he didn't renew the option February 6, 1997 he was out." (R. at 598.) 
After the Custom Crushing Lease had been signed, the parties performed pursuant 
to the Custom Crushing Lease. Ms. Fitzgerald testified, however, that she believed that 
the Original Lease continued to run concurrently with the Custom Crushing Lease. (See 
R. at 639-40.) 
Ms. Fitzgerald testified that she had gone to Custom Crushing on February 7, 
1997, and had said that the Original Lease had not been renewed and demanded the $.50 
per ton royalty. (See R. at 600.) Sheldon Smith testified that he had spoken to Craig 
Smith, attorney for Custom Crushing, and that Craig Smith had said that he had been 
waiting for the day that they could start paying the Fitzgeralds their royalty. (See R. at 
158-59.) Additionally, Sheldon Smith testified that Craig Smith had stated that he was 
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pleased to learn that Ray Bethers was no longer claiming an interest in the pit and that he 
had suggested placing money in escrow until a determination could be made with respect 
to the parties respective rights.4 (R. at 731.) Although Custom Crushing refused to pay 
when approached, the witnesses testified that in certain meetings held after that date, the 
Fitzgeralds and Custom Crushing entered into a joint strategy to eliminate Ray Bethers 
claims. (R. at 604, 732-44.) Those efforts included attempting to get Bethers to waive 
his claim in writing (R. at 732), a notice provision (R. at 735), filing a joint lawsuit (R. at 
735-44), and mediation (R. at 743). Finally, Sheldon Smith testified that the first time he 
had heard that Custom Crushing claimed that the Custom Crushing Lease superseded the 
Original Lease was when Custom Crushing filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 
746-48.) 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support the Trial Court *s Finding 
As discussed at length in section I above, a contract is substituted for another 
when it "incorporates all or part of an earlier agreement." Ringwood v. Foreign 
Autoworks, Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 183 n.2 (Utah 1983). The question of whether a contract 
substitutes for another "depends upon the intent of the parties." Id. at 183. "In 
determining whether an agreement was intended to supersede a prior agreement, a court 
4
 Custom Crushing objected to this evidence and believes that it was inadmissible to 
determine the intention of the parties because these were settlement negotiations. This is 
the subject of the fourth issue on appeal and the substantive matters will be dealt with in 
part IV. Custom Crushing only notes this evidence as it is required under the marshalling 
doctrine but does not waive its later arguments. 
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may consider extrinsic evidence as to the circumstances of the transaction, including the 
purpose for which the contested agreement was made." Id. 
However, the controlling principle of determining contracting parties' intentions 
with respect to a contract is clear: 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Whether 
the contract itself is ambiguous is also a question of law. An ambiguity 
exists if the contract provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation. 
Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, {^12, 62 P.3d 440 (quoting WebBank v. Am. Gen. 
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ 19, 54 P.3d 1139) (other citations omitted). 
As indicated above, the factual findings implicitly indicate that the trial court 
found that in entering the Custom Crushing Lease the parties did not intend to supersede 
the Original Lease with the Custom Crushing Lease, that the Original Lease still survived 
the Custom Crushing Lease,5 and that Bethers had a continuing interest in the Original 
Lease that could only be extended by submission of a written notice. 
What is critical to understand is that for the trial court to have made such a 
finding, it was required first to determine that the contractual language was ambiguous. 
Nowhere in the Custom Crushing Lease does it state that the obligation to Ray Bethers 
continued only if he supplied written notice to extend the Original Lease. As described 
above, in the Custom Crushing Lease, the Fitzgeralds agreed to a twenty-six cent per ton 
5
 This implicit finding is closely allied with the first implicit finding; they are, 
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royalty on materials "produced and sold on the Property until such time as Custom 
Crushing is no longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers." (Ex. H, 1J 1.) 
Once Custom Crushing was no longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers, 
the royalty to the Fitzgeralds was to increase to fifty cents per ton. 
The Custom Crushing Assignment declares that Bethers is to receive his royalty 
"during the term of 'The [Original Lease].'" (Ex. G, ^ 2.) As discussed above, the 
Original Lease had a six year term with two option periods. (See Ex. E at 1.) In order to 
find ambiguity, then, the trial court was required to find that "term of The [Original 
Lease]'" was ambiguous by reviewing the contractual language and determining that the 
language was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
Although it never made such a finding about the ambiguity of the contract, the 
trial court's findings and conclusion implicitly do so. Such a finding, however, cannot 
legitimately be made. A review of the Custom Crushing Assignment language makes 
clear that "term of 'The [Original Lease]" meant the entire term of the Original Lease, 
including the second option period. (See Ex. G.) Even if the Custom Crushing 
Assignment language were not clear, all of the parties who testified at trial testified that 
they understood that the "term of 'The [Original Lease]" to mean through the entire term 
of the Original Lease, including the second option period. (R. at 596-97, 634-35.) 
Thus, there was no dispute in the evidence about the meaning of any language in 
the contract. Rather, the dispute was the effect the parties understood the Custom 
consequently, discussed together. 
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Crushing Lease to have on the Original Lease: i.e., did the Custom Crushing Lease 
supersede the Original Lease or did the Original Lease continue to exist after the Custom 
Crushing Lease was entered? 
1. The Intent of the Parties was to Supersede the Original Lease 
In order for the Court to find that the parties agreed that Bethers would have the 
right to extend the Original Lease, the Court would have had to conclude that the parties 
intended for the Custom Crushing Lease and the Original Lease to exist concurrently. 
While it is true Norma Fitzgerald testified that she understood that the two leases existed 
concurrently, the evidence establishes without question that her statement of belief is 
simply unsupported and irrelevant. 
First, as discussed in section I supra, there is no question that in reviewing the four 
corners of the Custom Crushing Lease and the Original Lease, the Custom Crushing 
Lease was intended to completely supersede the Original Lease. The Fitzgeralds agreed 
in the Original Lease to provide material from certain property to its lessee from 1986 to 
1992. (See Ex. E at 1.) The Original Lease also gave the lessee the option to extend the 
term of the Original Lease for two additional five-year terms until 2002. (See Ex. E at 1.) 
The Original Lease provided that, in exchange for the right to remove material, the lessee 
would be required to pay the Fitzgeralds a royalty. (Ex. E at 2.) 
After Custom Crushing was assigned all of the rights in the Original Lease, but 
prior to the expiration of the first option period under that lease, Custom Crushing and the 
Fitzgeralds entered a new lease agreement. The Fitzgeralds agreed to a term that 
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provided for extraction of material until 2005 and asked for a higher royalty rate for the 
exact same material they were obligated to supply under the Original Lease. (Ex. E at 2; 
Ex.G,Kl.) 
This review of the four corners of the document reveals that there is no ambiguity. 
The Custom Crushing Lease superseded the Original Lease. As a matter of law, then, the 
trial court was precluded from considering any of the extrinsic evidence about whether 
the parties believed that the Original Lease existed concurrently with the Custom 
Crushing Lease. Accordingly, all of the evidence identified in part III.A above was 
irrelevant, and the trial court erred in allowing it. 
This also makes any further discussion about what the parties intended with 
respect to the obligation of Ray Bethers irrelevant. As noted in part I, a contractual duty 
is discharged by the entry of a substituted contract. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 
1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding "substitution of a contract which is accepted by the 
obligee in satisfaction of the original duty discharges the original duty"). Because the 
Custom Crushing Lease discharged the obligation to extend the Original Lease, the 
condition precedent had been met for the obligation to Bethers to continue. All of the 
parties agreed that, if Bethers, or anyone in his place, had extended the term of the 
Original Lease, Custom Crushing's obligation to Bethers would have continued. (R. at 
596-97, 634-35.) Since the Custom Crushing Lease had extended the right of Custom 
Crushing to remove the material through 2002, the parties had, in effect, extended the 
term of the Original Lease. Consequently, Custom Crushing's obligation to Ray Bethers 
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continued. 
The trial court, however, leap-frogged this problem by finding that the parties had 
agreed during negotiations, that, in order for the obligation to Bethers to continue, 
Bethers himself had to extend the Original Lease by written notice only. Not only is this 
finding inconsistent with the integration clause found in the Custom Crushing Lease (see 
Ex. G, T[12), but it is also inconsistent with the rules of contractual interpretation. Before 
the trial court could have properly considered extrinsic evidence in order to make such a 
determination, it should have first determined that the Fitzgeralds had demonstrated an 
ambiguity in the contract language susceptible to a "reasonable" alternative construction. 
The Fitzgeralds could point to no ambiguous contractual language nor could they 
point to a reasonable alternative construction. As discussed above, for the trial court to 
accept such an argument, it had to make the following unreasonable determinations: 
• contrary to long-established law, Bethers had continuing rights in a lease 
that all parties agreed had been completely assigned to another party; 
• despite the fact that parties had performed only under the Custom Crushing 
Lease since its entry, the Fitzgeralds and Custom Crushing were still 
performing under the Original Lease as well; and 
• a party was required to submit a written notice to extend a right to obtain 
material it was already entitled to under a separate agreement. 
Even if the trial court could consider such extrinsic evidence in the absence of any 
ambiguity, all such evidence could possibly reveal was that the parties understood that 
the Custom Crushing Lease superseded the Original Lease. All of the parties testified 
that the intention of the parties was to give Custom Crushing the ability to have the right 
to extract gravel until the year 2005. (See R. at 595 ("[There was still a period of time 
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that he didn't have a contract so he wanted this to fill in for when this [expired]."); R. at 
636-38, 724-25.) All of the parties testified that, after the entry of the Custom Crushing 
Lease, Custom Crushing paid the twenty-six-cent-per-ton royalty due under the Custom 
Crushing Lease, and that no one intended for Custom Crushing to be required to pay the 
twenty-five cent royalty under the Original Lease. (R. at 607-11, Trial Exs. P-7, P-8, P-9; 
R. at 6396.) In fact, there is no dispute that the Fitzgeralds understood that the parties 
were all performing pursuant to the Custom Crushing Lease, not the Original Lease, after 
•7 
the Custom Crushing Lease was signed. (See R. at 635-38.) 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
(R. at 639.) 
So did you get two royalties during the period? 
No. 
What did you get? 
Twenty-six cents a ton. 
And that was under which lease? 
Steve's lease. 
7
 Q Okay. And he came to you and he said, "I've got these rights, I want to 
enter a new lease." Is that accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did he want to do? Why did he want to enter a new lease? 
A Because he needed to be protected and because he'd offered us more 
money and he wanted to make a new agreement. 
Q And he wanted to have the full ten years to remove gravel from the pit; is 
that right? 
A And he communicated that to you? 
Q Yes. 
Q He did communicate to you that he wanted another deal, right? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q He wanted a new lease? 
A Yes, he wanted a new lease. 
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The trial court, therefore, could only find that the Custom Crushing Lease 
substituted for the Original Lease. Accordingly, it clearly erred.8 
2. Bethers Did Not Have Rights in the Original Lease 
As discussed in section II supra, because Bethers assigned his rights to Custom 
Crushing in the Custom Crushing Assignment, Bethers could not have had continuing 
rights in the Original Lease. As with the discussion in part III.B.l, above, in order for the 
trial court to make the determination that Bethers' rights in the Original Lease continued, 
the court must have made the initial legal conclusion that the documents were ambiguous 
as to Bethers' continuing interests in the Original Lease. 
However, as discussed above, a review of the explicit contractual language, which 
the trial court should have first looked to under standard contract interpretation 
Q So what did you do? 
A Well, he'd offered us 50 cents and we said we'd do that and we agreed to 
go with him to make a contract. 
Q So you entered the lease. And how long was the lease? 
A Steve's agreement? 
Q Yes. 
A I guess it goes to the end of the conditional use, 1995 [sic: 2005]. 
(R. at 636-38.) 
8
 The absurdity of the trial court's finding is illustrated by the following example. 
Suppose a person had entered into an agreement to lease a house for one year with 
subsequent options to extend the lease for up to four more years by written notice. After 
leasing the house for six months the person decides that he likes the house and is sure he 
will be in the area for several more years. Consequently, he approaches the homeowner 
and enters into a new lease for five years for a slightly higher rent rate. Under the trial 
court's analysis, if the landlord came to the lessee and demanded that he vacate the house 
for failure to submit written notice after a year had passed, the landlord would be 
perfectly within his rights. 
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principles, establishes without question that Bethers had assigned all of his rights to 
Custom Crushing. (See discussion supra, part I.) As a result, Bethers did not have legal 
authority to exercise any option under the Original Lease. 
Given a review of the unambiguous contractual language, the trial court was 
precluded from looking at extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties believed 
that Bethers had any continuing rights in the Original Lease. The trial court, therefore, 
erred when it looked to the evidence of intention outside of the scope of the contractual 
language to determine that the parties had agreed that Bethers could exercise the option at 
issue. 
Even looking at extrinsic evidence, however, it is clear that the parties understood 
that all of Bethers' rights had been assigned to Custom Crushing. Norma Fitzgerald had 
testified that she understood that once Bethers and Custom Crushing entered into the 
Custom Crushing Assignment, Custom Crushing had all the rights under the Original 
Lease. (See R. at 595, 630-36.)9 She testified that Bethers understood that he was simply 
9
 Q Okay. Now, what did you believe that the assignment gave Custom 
Crushing? 
A The assignment gave him the same thing that it had given Cliff [Read] and 
had given Ray Bethers. 
Q And what was that? 
A Had the right to crush. 
Q Did anyone else have the right to come in and crush? 
A No. 
Q So, you understood that Custom Crushing just took over Ray Bethers' 
rights? You understood that, right? 
A If he got that, yes, he did. 
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assigning the Original Lease to Custom Crushing. {See R. at 664.) Sheldon Smith 
understood that the Custom Crushing Assignment gave Custom Crushing the rights 
Bethers had had in the Original Lease. (See R. at 723-724, 763-64.)10 Steve Zabriskie, 
president of Custom Crushing, understood that Custom Crushing was receiving Bethers' 
rights in the Original Lease. (See R. at 787-88.) Thus, given the parties' understanding 
of the existing relationships between the Bethers and Custom Crushing, as a matter of 
law, the court could not have concluded that Bethers' had existing rights in the Original 
Q Now, under the terms of that assignment, Custom Crushing had all of the 
rights that Bethers had, did you understand that? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, did Bethers have a right to remove [gravel] after the he had assigned 
his rights to Custom Crushing? 
A No after he'd assigned his rights to Cursom Crushing, he didn't. 
(R. at 630, 633-34.) 
10
 Q You just said earlier in your testimony that Ray Bethers had given all his 
rights to Custom Crushing; isn't that your testimony? That under the assignment 
of option that was given to Custom Crushing, Bethers had assigned all of his 
rights? 
A He assigned his rights, that's my understanding. 
Q And what were the rights that he had? Those were rights in the original 
lease, right? 
A His rights to take gravel out of the pit, yes. 
Q So Bethers no longer had any rights. You understood that under the 
original lease? 
A He may still have some right to take gravel out for the royalties that he was 
entitled to. 
Q But that was pursuant to the assignment that Custom Crushing had with 
Bethers, right? 
A Right. 
(R. at 764-65.) 
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Lease. Given that Bethers had no existing rights in the Original Lease, he could not 
exercise the option to extend the lease. The trial court, therefore, clearly erred in making 
such a finding. 
C Conclusion 
The trial court clearly erred when it found that the Custom Crushing Lease did not 
supersede the Original Lease. Having done so, it incorrectly concluded that the 
obligation to extend the original lease had not been discharged, and, therefore that 
Custom Crushing had a duty to pay the heightened royalty beginning February 6, 1997. 
Custom Crushing respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment and remand 
to the trial court for an entry of judgment in favor of Custom Crushing. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATEMENTS OF 
THE PARTIES REGARDING A JOINT LITIGATION STRATEGY IN AN EFFORT TO 
COMPROMISE CLAIMS AGAINST EACH OTHER WERE NOT PROHIBITED BY 
RULE 408 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
A. Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
During the course of the trial, the Fitzgeralds offered testimony by Norma 
Fitzgerald and by Sheldon Smith, former attorney for the Fitzgeralds, regarding 
discussions that the Fitzgeralds and Custom Crushing had after the Fitzgeralds had 
indicated their intentions to claim additional royalties from Custom Crushing. {See R. at 
603-607, 731-739, 741-744, 771-777, 855-859, 868-869, 873-874, 881.) 
Norma Fitzgerald testified that on February 7, 1997, she went to the property 
where the Custom Crushing pit site was and told Steve Zabriskie that the Original Lease 
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"has not been renewed, now we get our 50 cents." (R. at 599-600.) Steve Zabriskie's 
response was to decline to pay and say, "I can't pay you both. I can't pay you both. Ray 
is still claiming rights." (R. at 600.) Counsel then asked Ms. Fitzgerald if she had 
participated in any meetings "with Custom Crushing regarding Ray Bethers." (R. at 
603.) Custom Crushing immediately objected that the discussions were barred under 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asked for voir dire. (R. at 603-04.) In 
that voir dire, Ms. Fitzgerald was clear that she was making claims against Custom 
Crushing: 
Q Mrs. Fitzgerald, had you asserted and were you threatening to assert 
a claim against Custom Crushing at the time you had those meetings? 
A We were all doing it together. 
Q But were you saying to Custom Crushing, you owe us the 
heightened royalty when you were having those meetings? 
A Yes. I thought we were entitled to them then. 
Q And what was Custom Crushing's response to that? 
A "I can't pay you both." 
Q And were these discussion then about how you could attempt to 
resolve those problems? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was to avoid litigation? 
A No, it was about litigation at that point. 
Q But it was to avoid litigation between Custom Crushing and you? 
A Yes. We weren't trying to sue Steve. 
Q But it was an attempt to avoid that, is that correct? 
A Right. 
MR. CROOK: Your Honor, I believe that these are settlement negotiations 
and I believe that any discussion that occurred in those negotiations is 
outside of Rule 408. 408 says that a party cannot bring in any evidence that 
is an attempt to establish liability arising out of settlement negotiations and 
that's exactly what they're trying to do. They're trying to establish [—] to 
use what was said in those meetings to establish that Custom Crushing had 
a particular intent in 1995. 
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(R. at 604-05.) Despite this objection, the trial court allowed the evidence in. {See R. at 
606-07.) Additionally, the court stated specifically that it would rely on the evidence to 
establish that Custom Crushing believed that it "did in fact have to get out of [the 
obligations with Bethers] in some way." (R. at 606.) 
Later, when Sheldon Smith, attorney for the Fitzgeralds, testified, the trial court 
again allowed evidence in of the negotiations. (See R. at 731-739, 741-744, 771-777, 
855-859, 868-869, 873-874, 881.) Sheldon Smith testified that he received a letter in 
which Craig Smith, attorney for Custom Crushing, proposed putting money in an escrow 
account during the time that the matter was being negotiated. (R. at 731; Trial Ex. P-17.) 
Custom Crushing objected. {See R. at 732.) The judge overruled the objection saying 
there was no dispute. (See id.) Sheldon Smith was then asked about a proposed joint 
litigation strategy to determine the liability of the parties. (See id. at 734.) Custom 
Crushing again objected. (See id.) The judge overruled the objection saying "taking 
legal action is not settlement discussions." (See id.) Sheldon Smith was asked about a 
complaint that was drafted by Custom Crushing and the Fitzgeralds. (See id. at 736; Trial 
Ex. P-18.) Custom Crushing again objected and asked to voir dire. (See id.) During voir 
dire, Custom Crushing asked: 
Q [The Fitzgeralds] had made claim against Custom Crushing, hadn't 
they, for the heightened royalty? 
A For the 50 cents that was suppose[d] to start February 7, 1997, yes. 
Q But they weren't paying it because they believed that Bethers had 
the obligation, right? 
A No. In fact they did not believe Bethers had the obligation. They 
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just wanted to make sure, they wanted something to solidify that Ray 
Bethers did not have an obligation. 
Q You were having these discussions to ferret that out; is that right? 
A We actually, the basis of this - and we talked about Ray Bethers a 
whole lot - and the basis of what we were doing was trying to determine, 
does Ray Bethers have an interest in the pit or not. 
Q And Custom Crushing wouldn't pay you until that had been 
determined, is that correct, pay the Fitzgeralds? 
A Yeah. They wanted to make sure they didn't have to pay both the 
Fitzgeralds and Ray Bethers. 
(R. at 737-38.) This time the trial court overruled the objection because the Fitzgeralds 
were not "suing Custom Crushing to force them to pay." (Id. at 738.) The Fitzgerald 
offered trial exhibits P-16, P-l & P-18. (Id. at 741.) Custom Crushing objected. (Id. at 
741-42.) The court overruled the objections stating that Custom Crushing had not 
"identified . . . the controversy." (Id. at 743.) 
In later testimony, Sheldon Smith admitted further that the Fitzgeralds made 
demand on Custom Crushing and Custom Crushing refused to pay the heightened 
royalty. (See id. at 771-775.) Craig Smith also testified that the purpose of the meetings 
was to resolve all of the issues between all of the parties, including the issues between 
Custom Crushing and the Fitzgeralds. (Id. at 855-859, 868-869, 873-874, 881.) 
Q . . . After 1997 when you were meeting with representatives of the 
Fitzgeralds, was it your understanding that you were only attempting to 
resolve the claims that Bethers had or were those attempts to resolve the 
claims that the Fitzgeralds were. . . 
A Both, both claims, both Fitzgeralds' claims for additional royalty and 
Bethers' claims for continued royalty. 
Q And so when you had any of those proposals, what was the intent? 
For instan[ce], the draft complaint, what were you intending to do with 
that? 
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A We were trying to resolve these issues or these claims. 
Q So it was not just Bethers you were trying to deal with? 
A No. 
(R. at 873-74.) 
On October 25, 2002, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (Findings & Conclusions, Ex. C.) The Findings and Conclusions explicitly relied 
on the events that occurred in the settlement discussions to establish the intent of the 
parties. 
23. During the years of 1997 up to 2001, Custom Crushing and Plaintiffs 
worked together to determine the rights, if any, of Bethers to compensation 
under the 1986 Agreement. 
23. In June 1999, Craig Smith, counsel to Custom Crushing, drafted a 
Complaint naming Custom Crushing and Ray Bethers as defendants 
seeking quiet title and a declaratory judgment to determine the rights, if 
any, of Bethers. 
24. In July 1999, Craig Smith, counsel to Custom Crushing, prepared a 
contingency fee agreement wherein Craig Smith's firm and Sheldon Smith, 
counsel to Plaintiffs, would share a ten cents per ton royalty from "the date 
the Court determines the [1986] terminated and Mr. Bethers is not entitled 
to royalty, and run through February 6, 2002, the last date the [Original 
Lease] and all options would expire if all required notices had been given. 
B. The Trial Court's Rulings Were Incorrect 
Utah Rule of Evidence 408 provides in full: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
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because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule 
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
"This rule follows verbatim Federal Rule of Evidence 408 which was used as a model in 
drafting the Utah Rules. Accordingly, this court looks to federal law interpreting Federal 
Rule of Evidence 408 to define the contours of Utah Rule of Evidence 408." Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ 
44 ,27P.3dl l l5 . 
One of the underlying or threshold requirements of the exclusionary rule is that the 
"'discussions in question [be] made in "compromise negotiations."'" Davidson, 918 P.2d 
at 1232 (quoting 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 408.04 (1988 & 
Supp. 1990)). Whether "compromise negotiations" are occurring depends on whether a 
party has a dispute with the other party with whom he is negotiating. "Rule 408 
exclusion applies where an actual dispute or a difference of opinion exists, rather than 
when discussions crystallize to the point of threatened litigation." Affiliated 
Manufacturers, Inc. v. Aluminum Company, 56 F.3d 521, 527 (3r Cir. 1995); accord 
Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1985); cf C.J. Duffey Paper 
Co v. Reger, 588 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) ("an 'actual controversy' must 
exist at the time of the alleged offer"). Additionally, "when the issue is doubtful, the 
better practice is to exclude evidence of compromise or compromise offers." Bradbury v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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A trial court's determinations arising under Rule 408 are reviewed for correctness. 
"[W]hen [an] evidentiary ruling at issue is an independent legal issue and does not 
involve the balancing of factors, [the Courts] review the determination for correctness." 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^|21, 989 P.2d 52 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1222 n.22 (Utah 1993)); cf. Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1233 (stating that "the trial judge was 
correct in admitting the statement from the letter sent by appellant to appellee because 
the letter was not an offer to compromise appellant's claim" (emphasis added)). 
In this case the trial court incorrectly ruled that the Fitzgeralds could present 
evidence of the parties discussions in their meetings after 1997 and the proposals that 
arose during those discussions. In the first instance, it is clear that the parties did have a 
dispute and that these negotiations were compromise negotiations. As discussed above, 
Norma Fitzgerald testified that she made claim on Custom Crushing for the heightened 
royalty the day after she claimed the written notice of extension was due. She also 
testified that immediately upon making that demand, Custom Crushing refused to pay the 
heightened royalty because Bethers was still making claim on the royalties and Custom 
Crushing refused to pay both Bethers and the Fitzgeralds. Sheldon Smith also testified 
that Custom Crushing refused to pay if both parties were making claims and would not 
do so until the matter had been completely resolved. Craig Smith's testimony is 
consistent as well. 
This clearly meets the definition of a dispute. In Affiliated Manufacturers, two 
parties disagreed about the amount of compensation that was owed. See 56 F.3d at 523. 
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The two parties began negotiations about those disagreements well before bringing a law 
suit. See id. The court ruled that "the scope of the term 'dispute' . . . include[s] a clear 
difference of opinion between the parties . . . concerning payment of two invoices" prior 
to litigation and excluded discussions and documents derived during that period. Id. at 
528. This case is analogous. Just as in Affiliated, the Fitzgeralds made a claim against 
Custom Crushing, as did Bethers. Custom Crushing refused to pay the Fitzgeralds 
because Bethers was continuing to make claim for his royalties. Custom Crushing did 
not believe that both parties were correct and refused to pay the Fitzgeralds what they 
claimed. The parties admittedly entered into negotiations in an attempt to avoid litigation 
and to settle the controversy. 
C The Error Was Harmful 
In this case, it is clear that absent the trial court's error in allowing the evidence in, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached. See 
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT 80, 1f8, 977 P.2d 508. In overruling its 
objections, the trial court was very clear to point out that it was relying on the evidence 
deriving from the settlement negotiations in determining Custom Crushing's intent. The 
trial court specifically stated that it would rely on the evidence to establish that Custom 
Crushing believed that it "did in fact have to get out of [the obligations with Bethers] in 
some way." (R. at 606.) Additionally, the trial court specifically made findings with 
regard to the settlement negotiations, relying on the evidence of the discussions and 
documents produced in those discussions to establish what it believed Custom Crushing 
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intent in 1995. 
Further, without this evidence there would be no significant evidence of the 
intention of the parties with respect to their understanding of the agreements. For 
instance, more than half of the questions to Sheldon Smith on direct examination (all but 
11 page of the twenty-eight pages of the transcript) were about these post-1997 
settlement negotiations (See R. at 731-748.) Additionally, the trial court chastised 
Custom Crushing when it objected to documents and evidence relative to the joint 
litigation strategy, suggesting that this evidence clearly affected the findings and 
conclusions. (See R. at 741-42.) Moreover, the findings themselves include three 
paragraphs dedicated to the settlement negotiations and only one paragraph mentioning 
pre-Custom Crushing Lease negotiations. 
D. Conclusion 
Given the trial court's harmful error in allowing evidence of settlement 
negotiations at the time of the trial, Custom Crushing requests that the trial court's 
judgment be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial to excluding any evidence of 
the discussions or documents deriving from the settlement negotiations 
CONCLUSION 
Custom Crushing respectfully submits that the trial court incorrectly denied its 
motion for summary judgment when it determined that there was an issue of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, Custom Crushing respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court order and remand for the entry of summary judgment in 
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favor of Custom Crushing. 
In the alternative, Custom Crushing submits that the trial court incorrectly 
concluded that Bethers had continuing rights in the Original Lease. Given that Bethers 
had assigned his rights in the Original Lease to Custom Crushing, Bethers had no right to 
extend the option. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the Original Lease 
could only be extended by written notice from Bethers. Accordingly, Custom Crushing 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the judgment and remand for entry of 
judgment against the Defendants. 
Additionally, Custom Crushing submits that the trial court clearly erred in finding 
that the Custom Crushing Lease did not supersede the Original Lease. Having done so, it 
incorrectly concluded that the obligation to extend the original lease had not been 
discharged, and, therefore, that Custom Crushing had a duty to pay the heightened royalty 
to the Fitzgeralds beginning February 6, 1997. Custom Crushing respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for an entry of judgment 
in favor of Custom Crushing. 
Finally, the trial court incorrectly permitted clearly harmful evidence of 
discussions and documents deriving from settlement negotiations. Accordingly, Custom 
Crushing respectfully requests that this Court remand the case to the trial court for a new 
trial. 
4816-0240-9984 CU781 010 49 
DATED this _2> day of August, 2003. 
SMITRHARTVIGSEN PLLC 
D. Setftt Crook 
Attorney for Appellant Custom Crushing, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
i d * " BRIEF were served via first-class mail, postage pre-paid, U.S. Mail, this I* day of 
August, 2003 to the following: 
Brian J. Babcock 
BABCOCK, SCOTT, BABCOCK 
57 West South Temple, 8th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Defendant Ray Bet hers 
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D. Notice of Appeal 
E. Option for Purchase of Sand and Gravel 
F. Purchase and Broker Agreement 
G. Assignment of Option 
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Appendix A 
No.. 
Sheldon A. Smith, A4914 
SHELDON A. SMITH & ASSOCIATES, 
a Professional Corporation 
P.O. Box 972 
149 South Main Street 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (435) 336-1200 
Fax: (435) 336-0195 
^ tL£E 
• SEP.-5 208! 
-By "f)lro ^ ••*n*4 wourt 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON FITZGERALD, NORMA 
FITZGERALD, STEVEN 
FITZGERALD and CLOVERLEAF 
RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RAY BETHERS and CUSTOM 
CRUSHING, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING CROSS 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 00060063 CM 
Judge Robert Hilder 
On Wednesday, August 1, 2001, Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment and Defendant Custom Crushing, Inc.'s Motion For 
Summary Judgment was heard by the Honorable Judge Hilder, District 
Court Judge. Plaintiffs' were represented by Sheldon A. Smith and 
Defendant Custom Crushing was represented by D.Scott Crook. Based 
upon the arguments of counsel and other good cause, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Custom 
Crushing's Motion for Summary Judgment are denied based upon the 
Courts finding that there are material issues of fact and that 
00228 
their are ambiguities in how the Contracts are construed together. 
DATED this 9 ^ day otJ^fagL 2001. 
Ju^e/Rbbert'HXlder ~^ : 
District Court Judge f 
APPRQVEDNAS TO FORM: 
Crook 
Attorney for Custom Crushing 
Sheldon A. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed first class, postage prepaid, this /o 
day of August 2001. 
J. Craig Smith 
D. Scott Crook 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Suite 1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian J. Babcock 
BABCOCK, BOSTWICK, et al. 
57 West South Temple 
8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Sheldon A Smith 
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un.blNAL 
Brian J. Babcock (6172) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 W. South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7060 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON FITZGERALD, NORMA 
FITZGERALD, STEVEN FITZGERALD, 
and CLOVERLEAF RANCH, L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAY BETHERS and CUSTOM CRUSHING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. : 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 000600063 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The Court having previously signed and entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
on October 25,2002, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, Plaintiffs are awarded 
judgment against Defendant Custom Crushing as follows: 
Principal ($.24 x 1,548,565.4 tons of material $371,655.70 
up through May 31, 2002) 
Prejudgment interest (10 % per year to $93,785.73 
December, 2002) 
Accrued costs to date of judgment $717.92 
Attorneys fees per affidavits $42,671.42 
Less credit for payments to MCM on behalf of <$ 1,600.00 
Ray Bethers 
Credit for material used by Plaintiffs <$4,991.72> 
TOTAL JUDGMENT . $502,239.05 
with interest accruing hereafter at the^e^aT rate until paid in full. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the money deposited with the Court by Custom 
Crushing is to be released to Plaintiffs immediately after the time for Custom Crushing to appeal 
this Judgment, unless Custom Crushing posts a supercedious bond with its appeal. Upon receipt 
of said payment, Plaintiffs are ordered to credit the amount received from the Court towards this 
Judgment against Custom Crushing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Custom Crushing is obligated to pay to Plaintiffs the 
fifty cent ($0.50) royalty for all materials removed from the Property regardless whether or not 
Custom Crushing received payment for the materials removed. This applies to all material 
except that material listed on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
fifty cents ($.50) per ton for all materials removed after May 31, 2002, less any payments made 
by Custom Crushing to Plaintiffs. Said amounts to be augmented shall be established by 
affidavit. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Custom Crushing is to pay Plaintiffs fifty cents ($0.50) 
per ton royalty for all payments received for materials listed on Plaintiffs" Exhibit 13. 
2 00529 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims of Custom Crushing regarding storage or 
removal of the scales from the Property are dismissed with prejudice. 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount 
of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this to ~ day of 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the [[) day of December, 2002,1 mailed by U.S. mail, first-class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the 
following: 
D. Scott Crook 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Suite 1150, Eagle Gate Plaza and Officer Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Brian J. Babcock (6172) 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT 
CRAWLEY & PRICE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7000 
Facsimile: (801)531-7060 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
DON FITZGERALD, NORMA 
FITZGERALD, STEVEN FITZGERALD, 
and CLOVERLEAF RANCH, L.C., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RAY BETHERS and CUSTOM CRUSHING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 000600063 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The above entitled matter came before Judge Robert K. Hilder on a bench trial on July 9, 
10, and 11, 2002. Plaintiffs were represented by Brian J. Babcock of BABCOCK, BOSTWICK, 
SCOTT, CRAWLEY & PRICE and Defendant Custom Crushing was represented by D. Scott 
Crook of NIELSEN & SENIOR. Based up the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the 
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Fitzgeralds and Cloverleaf ("Plaintiffs") are the owners of a gravel pit located 
0 c r
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in Francis, Summit County, Utah (the "Property"). 
2. In 1986, the Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with L. Clifton Read, Jr. 
("Read") entitled "Option for Purchase of Sand and Gravel" ("1986 Agreement"), which gave 
Read the right to remove sand and gravel from the Property. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #1) 
3. The 1986 Agreement had an initial option period of six (6) years. 
4. The 1986 Agreement had two (2) additional five (5) year option periods. 
5. The 1986 Agreement required that written notice be provided to the Plaintiffs of 
any election to extend any of the two subsequent option periods prior to the expiration of the 
previous option period. 
6. On or about June 26, 1991, Read entered into a "Purchase and Broker Agreement" 
with Bethers, which sold and assigned to Bethers the rights and interests Read had obtained in 
the 1986 Agreement to remove sand and gravel from the Property. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #2) 
7. On or about January 22, 1992, Bethers sent a "Notice of Extension" to the 
Plaintiffs which exercised the second option period and extended the 1986 Agreement to 
February 6, 1997. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #3) 
8. On or about May 5, 1995, Bethers entered into an "Assignment of Option" with 
Custom Crushing, which assigned to Custom Crushing the rights Bethers had obtained from 
Read to remove sand and gravel from the Property. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #4) 
n 9. >#Hie Assignment.of Optron wao drafted by j ^ t o m Crushing. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #5) 
' 10. The Assignment of Option required Custom Crushing to pay Bethers "twenty 
cents ($0.20) per ton royalty for all sand, gravel, aggregate or other rock product sold which is 
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produced and sold on or from the Property during the term of 'The Option for Purchase of Sand 
and Gravel'" (which is the 1986 Agreement reference herein). 
11. The Assignment of Option required Custom Crushing to provide Bethers with 
monthly notice of the amount of royalty to which Bethers was entitled. Bethers was to take his 
material royalty within one year of such notice. 
12. Custom Crushing provided two (2) notices to Bethers of royalty. One dated July 
10, 1996 (Plaintiffs Ex. #11) and one dated August 1. 1996 (Plaintiffs' Ex. #12). 
13. Custom Crushing did not provide any further notices. 
14. On or about June 6, 1995, the Plaintiffs entered into a "Lease Agreement" with 
Custom Crushing, which allowed Custom Crushing to remove sand and gravel from the Property. 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. #5) 
ment was drafted by Custom Crushing. 15. The Lease Agree (Plaintiffs' Ex. #5) 
A 
16. The Lease Agreement provided that Custom Crushing was to pay the Plaintiffs a 
royalty of ($0.26) per ton of material sold "until such time as Custom Crushing was no longer 
obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers." The Lease Agreement further stated that "at 
the time Custom Crushing is no longer obligated to provide compensation to Ray Bethers, the 
royalty to the [Plaintiffs] shall be increased to ($0.50) per ton." 
17. During the negotiation of the Lease Agreement, Custom Crushing stated that it 
would rather pay Plaintiffs than Bethers. 
+8: Duiiug Ihu ntgulialiun of Lhe Lease Agreement, Custom Crushing slaltd llial it-
would not exercise me last option period Hi llie 1986 AMieeih'eliL^ 
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19. During the negotiation of the Lease Agreement, Plaintiffs and Custom Crushing 
agreed that if Bethers provided written notice to the Plaintiffs prior to February 6,1997 to 
exercise the last option period, the 1986 Agreement and compensation to Bethers would be 
extended to February 6, 2002. 
20. No written notice was delivered to the Plaintiffs prior to February 6, 1997 to 
exercise the last five-year option period under the 1986 Agreement. 
21. On or about May 24, 1997, the Plaintiffs had delivered to Bethers written notice 
informing him of the expiration of the 1986 Agreement. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #6) 
22. During the years of 1997 up to 2001, Custom Crushing and Plaintiffs worked 
together to determine the rights, if any, of Bethers to compensation under the 1986 Agreement. 
23. In June 1999, Craig Smith, counsel to Custom Crushing, drafted a Complaint 
naming Custom Crushing and Ray Bethers as defendants seeking quite title and a declaratory 
judgment to determine the rights, if any, of Bethers. (Plaintiffs Ex. #18) 
24. In July 1999, Craig Smith, counsel to Custom Crushing, prepared a contingency 
fee agreement wherein Craig Smith's firm and Sheldon Smith, counsel to Plaintiffs, would share 
a ten cents per ton royalty from "the date the Court determines the [1986 Agreement] terminated 
and Mr. Bethers is not entitled to royalty, and run through February 6, 2002, the last date the 
[1986 Agreement] and all options would expire if all required notices had been given." 
(Plaintiffs'Ex. #19) 
25. From 1996 through May 31, 2002, Custom Crushing has paid to Plaintiffs a 
royalty of twenty-six cents ($0.26) per ton. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #7) 
-
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26. From February 7, 1997 through May 31, 2002, Custom Crushing has removed and 
been paid for 1,548,565.4 tons of material from the Property. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #7 and Ex. #8) 
27. From February 7,1997, Custom Crushing has not paid Plaintiffs for any material 
that was removed from the Property for which Custom Crushing has not been paid by its 
customer. 
28. Plaintiffs have received material and credited to Custom Crushing a total of 
$4,991.72 for said material. (Plaintiffs' Ex. #8 and #9) 
29. Custom Crushing paid on Bethers behalf $ 1,600 to MCM for engineering services 
performed at the Property. 
30. Bethers provided scales to the Property for Custom Crushing's use pursuant to the 
Assignment of Option. The Assignment of Option states that "at the end of the term of the 
'[1986 Agreement]', Bethers may take possession of the scales." (Plaintiffs' Ex. #4) 
31. On or about June 15,1998, Custom Crushing requested that Bethers remove the 
scales from the Property. (Defendant's Ex. #9) 
32. On or about May 1, 2001, Bethers assigned to Plaintiffs all of his rights, interest 
and claims, if any, against Custom Crushing. (Plaintiffs'Ex. #10) 
33. Custom Crushing has deposited funds with the Court pursuant to a previous 
stipulation between the parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the express terms of the 1986 Agreement, the agreement would terminate 
on February 6, 1997 if the last option was not exercised by Bethers. 
"
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2. The last option contained in the 1986 Agreement which would have extended the 
term to February 6, 2002 was not exercised. 
3. Without the required notice to exercise, the 1986 Agreement expired under its 
own terms on February 6, 1997, and thereafter had no legal force or effect. 
4. After February 6, 1997, Custom Crushing was no longer obligated to provide 
compensation to Bethers. 
5. After February 6, 1997, Custom Crushing was obligated to pay to Plaintiffs a 
royalty of fifty cents ($0.50) per ton for all material removed from the Property. 
6. Plaintiffs" Exhibit #8 accurately sets for the yearly amounts of material which 
Custom Crushing has removed from the Property and for which it has been paid after February 7, 
1997 up through May 31, 2002, that being 1,548,565.4 tons of material. 
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Custom Crushing for the amount of 
twenty-four cents ($0.24) per ton for each of the 1,548.565.4 set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit #8. 
8. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on 
each unpaid monthly royalty payment subsequent to February 7, 1997 when it was due and 
payable to Plaintiffs. 
9. Custom Crushing is obligated to pay to Plaintiffs the fifty cent ($0.50) royalty for 
all materials removed from the Property after February 7, 1997 regardless whether or not Custom 
Crushing receives payment for the materials removed. 
10. Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to support its claims for materials 
removed from the Property by Custom Crushing to which Custom Crushing has not been paid. 
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(Plaintiffs Ex. #13). Nevertheless, when Custom Crushing is paid for the materials listed on 
Plaintiffs Ex. #13, Custom Crushing is to pay to Plaintiffs fifty cents ($0.50) per ton royalty for 
all payments received. 
11. The Assignment of Option language regarding the removal of scales is 
ambiguous. 
12. After the expiration of the 1986 Agreement on February 6, 1996, Bethers was not 
obligated to remove the scales from the Property. 
13. Even if Bethers was obligated to remove the scales from the Property, Custom 
Crushing did not provide any credible evidence to support its claims for storage or removal of the 
scales from the Property. All such claims are to be dismissed with prejudice. 
14. Custom Crushing did not provide Bethers with a proper accounting of the 
materials produced during the period of time in which Bethers was entitled to compensation. 
15. The material or payments which Custom Crushing provided to Bethers or its 
assign MCM was for royalty compensation to which Bethers was entitled and is not to be 
credited against royalties owed to Plaintiffs. 
16. Bethers has waived any further rights or claims to related to the Property for lack 
of notice provided by Custom Crushing and is not entitled to any additional material royalties 
from Custom Crushing or the Property. 
17. Custom Crushing is entitled to a credit of $1,600 against Plaintiffs as assignee of 
Bethers" claims for payment made to MCM. 
18. Custom Crushing is entitled to a credit of $4,991.72 for materials provided to 
Plaintiffs as provided on Plaintiffs' Exhibit #8 and Exhibit #9. 
19. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party to this action and are entitled to an award of 
their court costs and attorneys fees incurred in this action. 
20. The money which has been deposited with the Court by Custom Crushing in 
accordance with a previously filed stipulation between the parties is to be released to Plaintiffs 
immediately after the time to for Custom Crushing to appeal the judgment in this matter, unless 
Custom Crushing posts a supercedious bond with its appeal. Plaintiffs shall credit towards the 
judgment against Custom Crushing any funds received from the Court. 
DATED this ^ J " B a y of Augusr, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
teert K. Hilder 
Approved as to Form: 
DATED this day of August, 2002. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
By:. 
D. Scott Crook, Esq. 
Attorney for Custom Crushing 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000600063 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BRIAN J BABCOCK 
ATTORNEY PLA 
57 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE 
8TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84101-0000 
Mail D. SCOTT CROOK 
ATTORNEY DEF 
1100 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
6 0 EA SO TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated t h i s <Qfi> day of Or*. 
£l*hh*C* K cicu;tA7f; 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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D. Scott Crook (7495) 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Suite 1150 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 413-1600 
Fax: (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys for Defendant Custom Crushing 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON FITZGERALD, NORMA 
FITZGERALD, STEVEN 
FITZGERALD, and CLOVERLEAF 
RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
RAY BETHERS and CUSTOM 
CRUSHING, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CaseNo.000600063 
Judge Robert Hilder 
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant Custom Crushing, Inc., by and through its 
attorneys of record, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the Order Denying Cross 
Motions for Summary Judgment entered by the Honorable Robert Hilder on September 5, 
2001, and the Judgment entered by the Honorable Robert Hilder in this matter on January 7, 
2003. Appeal is taken from the entire order and the entire judgment. 
00534 
DATED this £ _ day of February, 2003. 
SMPTfi HARTVIGSERPLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was 
served via first-class mail, postage pre-paid, U.S. Mail, , this of February, 2003 to the 
following: 
Brian J. Babcock 
BABCOCK, SCOTT, BABCOCK 
57 West South Temple, 8th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Defendant Ray Bethers 
482M535-6544CU781 010 
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ALAN SrriJGGS 
SUMMIT COUNTY R^vOER 
ft**. ti*f. *£. 
OPTION FOR 
PURCHASE OF SAND 
AND GRAVEL 
This Agreement, entered into this &7& day of February, 1966, 
by and between L. Clifton Read, Jr., (herein "Read") and Don M. 
Fitzgerald and Norma Fitzgerald, his wife, of RFDf Kamas (Francxs) 
Utah (herein "Owners11) . Steven Don Fitzgerald (their son) an 
interest owner of RFD, Kamas (Francis) Utah (herein "Owners"). 
WITNESSETH 
The SMk of the NEk of 
Section 32, T2S, R 6 E, 
SLB i M. 
The option may be exercised by Reads removal of materials from 
time to tine as he shall determine. 
OPTION FERIOD-EXTZKSIONS 
This option shall remain in full force and effect for a period 
of six (6) years from date hereof unless renewed as provided for 
herein, If Read shall purchase materials during the initial six 
year option period, (the "initial option" period), he shall have 
the right to extend the option for an additional five years (the 
"second option11 period). If Read shall purchase materials during 
the second option period he shall have the right to extend the 
option for an additional five years following expiration of the 
second option period. Notice of exercise of Reads election co 
extend the option with respect to the first five year extension 
shall be given prior to expiration of the initial option period 
and notice with respect to the second five year extension shall 
be given prior to expiration of the second option period. Any 
such notices given by Read shall be in writing and shall be 
deemed delivered upon personal delivery to owners or either of 
then or posting in the United States mail postage prepaid in an 
envelope addressed to owners at RFD Kamas (Francis), Utah. 
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(a) Owners ownership of fee sicp: 
property and the materials. title to the 
(b)
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^, ^ cu> uceu removed by head frcrc the property curing 
A e first year, subject to the foregoing, the owners upon written 
notice to Read may terminate this option, 
2. If this option is exercised by the removal of materials 
by Read then $400.00 of the $500,00 option money shall be credited 
against the purchase price of the first materials removed by 
Read. 
3. The Owners shall provide water to Read without expense 
to him as shall be required to wash materials removed from the 
property. 
4. All livestock and other property of Owners shall be 
protected during materials removal operations. Any fences re-
moved or damaged during the course of removal operations shall be 
repaired or replaced to their condition as of the date of this 
Agreement. 
5. Materials removed shall commence along the northwesterly 
margin of the existing gravel terrace and proceed therefrom 
southeasterly. The floor of the excavation shall be left reason-
ably smooth and as near as reasonably possible shall be sloped 
uniformly from east to west at. a uniform 1Z grade. The terminal 
ends of the excavated area shall effect a squared off east-west 
north south alignment and the cut banks 6hall be sloped at 2:1 
or less. 
6. All topsoil on the excavated area shall be stockpiled 
and spread over the excavation at the conclusion of material 
operations. 
7. A road from the excavated area to the right of way road 
shall be established by Read. 
8. At the termination of materials removal operations the 
excavation shall consist of one continuous excavated area scuarec 
offf vith north-south east vest terminal cut banks and the sane 
shall be cyclone seeded to the Owners reasonable satisfaction and 
all fences damaged or removed by Read shall be re-established as 
provided for herein. 
IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this agreement 
the day and year above set forth. 
OWRERS: «G-. 4B2p;cr7i6 
Don M. Fitigep^JTcl 
StAte of UtAh ) 
) 
) 
County of Summit) 
ea 
the Glgners of the f < , « , o l . , ,„??! °°? L- " " » » Red, Jr . , 
signed the
 f o r e S o i n G
n
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Appendix F 
ruKCHASE AND BROKER AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made this QC?** day of June, 2991 between 
L. CLIFTON READ. JR. (herein "Read") and RAY BETHERS 
(herein "Bethers") 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
Recitals. Read is Optionee under a certain Option Agreement 
hereinafter more particularly described together with rights-
of-way, permits and other governmental approvals related thereto 
relating to a gravel pit operation located on property herein-
after described, together vith weigh scales located in the gravel 
pit and a stock pile of materials also located in the gravel pit. 
Bethers have agreed to purchase Read's interest in the Option 
Agreement and in the scales and to sell the stock pile of mater-
ials on Read's behalf. This Agreement sets forth the terms and 
provisions agreed to by the parties with respect to the subject 
matter. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants of 
the parties hereto, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Description of Property to be Sold. Pveac hereby sells 
and assigns to Bethers all of his right, title and interest ir. 
and tc the following describee property: 
All the right, title and interest of Read under 
and pursuant to that certain "Option for Purchase of 
Sand and Gravel" dated February 6, 1986, executed by 
Don M. and Norma Fitzgerald and Steven Don Fitzgeralc 
as "Owners" and L. Clifton Read, Jr., as "Read", vhicr 
Option was recorded February 10, 1988 in Book 462 at 
Pages 7Ii-717 of the official records of the Summit 
County Recorder covering property described as the 
Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 
32, Township 2 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base £ 
Meridian. 
All right, title and interest of Read in and to 
the weigh scales now located on the property described 
in the Option Agreement above referred to. 
All right, title and interest of Read in and -to 
the Conditional Use Permit issued by the Summit County 
Planning Commission with respect to the gravel pit and 
crushing operation conducted on the property described 
in the Option, together with all road encroachment 
permits, right-of-way agreements and subject to the 
Road Maintenance Agreement with Summit County, each 
pertaining to the said gravel pit operation. 
Bethers acknowledge that they are experienced in the crushing and 
gravel p i t operations; that they are* fami l ia r wi th the property 
which i s the subject of the Option, and t h a t they are familiar* 
wi th the Option, the opera t ing permits and the Road Maintenance 
Agreement: and that they have agreed to accept t r ans fe r of Read's 
i n t e r e s t in said agreements and r i g h t s , subjec t to a l l exis t ing 
c la ims and defenses r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o and without warranty by 
Read. Read makes no representation or warranty with respect to 
the v a l i d i t y or enforceabil i ty of the Option and permits and 
rights-of-way relat ing thereto, but has agreed, in effect , to 
Quit Claim whatever i n t e r e s t he may have in the same to Bethers. 
Should Bethers des i r e , Read agrees to execute a separate short 
form assignment r e l a t i n g to the Option Agreement and re la ted 
permi ts and r i g h t s . 
2. Purchase Price of P roper t i e s Described in Paragraph 1. 
In cons idera t ion of the t r a n s f e r and assignment to Bethers of 
Read 's r i gh t s in and to the proper ty described in Paragraph 1, 
Bethers agrees to pay Read the sum of $20,000 payable as follows: 
$5,000 on demand by Read. Read acknowledges that 
Bethers i s e n t i t l e d to a c r e d i t aga ins t said sum of 
$5,000 for t r anspor t a t ion of equipment in the amount of 
approximately $2,200, the exact amount of which i s to 
be determined between Pvead and Bethers upon the furn-
i sh ing of an accounting by Bethers and concurrence by 
Read. Read may r e q u i r e add i t i ona l serv ices from 
Bethers , in which event Pvead s h a l l defer demand for the 
payment of the remaining balance of sa id $5,000, 
pending the performance of such add i t i ona l se rv ices . 
The balance of $15,000 s h a l l be paid on a monthly 
b a s i s on or before the 10th day of each month here-
a f t e r , based upon 10c per ton for a l l ma te r i a l s in the 
g rave l p i t excavated, crushed and shipped by Bethers 
during the preceding month. All such ma te r i a l s shal l 
be weighed at the p i t when shipped and Bethers sha l l 
provide an accounting to Read on or before the 10th cay 
of each month following shipment of such mater ia l s and 
concurrent with the furnishing of such, accounting shal l 
pay to Read the amount due Read based upon 10c per ten. 
The $15,000 balance due Read s h a l l not bear i n t e r e s t , 
providing the e n t i r e amount thereof i s paid on or 
before January 1, 1992. Any remaining unpaid balance 
due as of January 2f 1992, s h a l l bear i n t e r e s t at- the 
r a t e of 121 per annum. 
3 . Stock Pi le of Mater ia l s to be Sold by Bethers for Read's 
Account. The pa r t i e s acknowledge as of the date of th i s Agree-
ment t h a t there is a stock p i l e of ma te r i a l s produced and owned 
by Read consis t ing of approximately 30,000 tons of commercial 
road b a s e ; 2,000 tons of cobble rock; 1,000 tons of s t a t e spec 
road b a s e , and 500 tons of drain rock. The p a r t i e s acknowledge 
t h a t the quant i t i es shown here in are simply rough estimates of 
t u 6 ctQOlil l tc Vjpi J 
each ton so ld -nll'S ? . o t h e r w i s e agreed <n £r<>* v t h e S U 3 of 
be weighed a? S d f l l V € " d by Bethers A?T 1 X ? b y R e a c ) for 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parti 
Agree—er.r the day and year first a 
rOTn r h e
 Party
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"* ^  /??/ 
ies hereto have 
above vritten. 
READ: 
executed --*• 
".-s 
BETHERS: 
R
=y Bethers 
Address: 
^ ^ / . _ £ ^ Z ^ _ 
Appendix G 
ASSIGNMENT OF OPTION 
T«S
 A S S 1 G N M E N T 0 P o p T I Q N is m a d e a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
= d«y of
 M a y , 1 9 9 5 / b y a n d a m o n g C U S T O M C R U S H I N G _ I N C ^ ^ ^ 
corporat ion , ("Oust™ crushing", and RAY BETHERS , . B . r h . r . ' . , . 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. on Kebruary
 6 . 1 9 8 6 D o n , , J o r a a a n d ^ ^ ^ 
c o ! e c t i v e l y . n t x q m U B m ) e n t e r e d ^ a w i t t e n | o p t i o n 
" °
f
 " "
 a n d
 -
1
" "
i t h
 - « " - n Read,
 J r . ( „ R e a d „ ) t o 
7 b e d as the sw - « - » v . <* sec t i M 32, Township; 
south. Range « East, saat
 talc. B a s e a n d Keridian ( „ t h e 
S o id Ac••c'-•-.-=-- ,-,- - < - . > ; • 
•- -• — a,, .ecordc-d as Entrv
 No. 2S3655 in *-« 
.. c " -°-<^ in c.e records of 
^he Sur.au County Recorder. 
B. On
 June 26. 1 9 9 1 B e t h e r s t o o k a s s i g n B e n t Q f a u ^ 
«9ht,
 tltle and interest to the P r o p e r t y th a 
=..d Broker Agreement" with Read, „hor.by E e t h e r E 
assignment from Read
 n f an f ,. 
a
" °
f h l S r i
*
t S
 «"««••• the February 6 
"66 .option for Purchase of Sand and Gravel... 
c.
 B o w B e t h e r s d e s i r e s t o ^ ^ ^ a n ^ ^ ^ 
-party un.er the "Option for Purchase of Sana and Crave,.
 and 
errBroker A9™ t" to a"t-cr— •*— 
to accept such assignment pursuant to the terrcs 
"d cond i t ions of t h i s Assignment of Option. 
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises 
and covenants herein contained, and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties agree and represent as follows: 
1. Assignment of Rights by Bethers 
Bethers will forever assign to Custom Crushing- aril right, 
title and interest in and to the Property and to all sand, gravel, 
aggregate or other rock or earth products produced on or from the 
Property. In consideration for such release and waiver, Custom 
Crushing shall pay Bethers twenty cents (200) per ton royalty for 
all sand, gravel, aggregate or other rock product sold which is 
produced and sold on or from the Property during the term of "The 
Option for Purchase of Sand and Gravel". 
Z.. Pavrent in Materials 
Bethers shall not be entitled to any monetary payment for the 
royalty described in Paragraph 1, but agrees to accept as his 
exclusive method of payment compensation in the form of product 
produced in the sand and gravel operation on the Property. The 
value of one such product, road base, is agreed to be $3.18 per ton 
for 19S5. The value of any other product(s) shall be as agreed by 
the parties. During future year(s) the value shall be adjusted 
annually by changes in equal proportion to the changes in price for 
sales by Custom Crushing from the Property of product. _Bethers 
shall have the right to select the type of product he desires, 
subject to the limitations herein, and further agrees to take 
product to satisfy his royalty within one year of his being given 
2 
i 
no t i ce tha t he i s en t i t l ed to such royal ty by Custom Crushing from 
the sand and cravel operation during the normal business hours and 
r egu la r season of the operat ion. Bethers shall be provided product 
by Custom Crushing only when such product i s avai lable during the 
normal operations of the gravel p i t operat ion. Bethers sha l l have 
no r i g h t to require Custom Crushing to work beyond normal operation 
hours or regular days and seasons of operation. No royalty shall 
be due to Bethers for sand, gravel aggregate or other rock product 
produced t o sat isfy Bether 's roya l ty . 
3. Timing of Payment and Inspection of Records 
Custom Crushing shal l advise Bethers monthly of the amount of 
r o y a l t y se t forth in Paragraph 1. Bethers shal l have the r ight to 
i n s p e c t , upon reasonable no t ice , the records of Custom Crushing as 
co tonnages produced and sold a t the Property. Bethers shal l take 
such product to s a t i s i y his royal ty within one year of such notice. 
4 . Payments to Read 
Bethers shall he responsible for any and a l l payments, 
compensation or monies due or owing to L. Clifton Read, C.R. Sales, 
I nc . and/or Park City Rock Products under the "Purchase and Broker 
Agreement" or for any other reason and Bethers sha l l hold harr.less 
ind indemnify Custom Crushing from a l l claims, causes of action, 
i a b i l i t y , costs , expenses or a t torneys fees ar is ing from any claim 
f L. Clif ton Read, C.R. Sales , Inc . and/or Park City Rock 
r o d u c t s . 
3 
t 
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Bethers « 1 leave and
 M k £ a v a i l a M e f w t h e u s e ^ c ^ t o n 
Crushing
 t h. s c a l e s a n d , u Q t h e r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
th. Property.
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Crushing determines
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 a n d B e t h e r £ s h a n ^ h i s o u n ^ ^ ^ 
Purchase of sand ana Crave!".
 B e t h e r s m a y t a k e ^ ^ 
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Bethers
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actional
 p r o d u c t p r o d u c e d o n t h £ ^ ^ ^ ^ t h e ^ ^ ^ 
estabUshod for royalty purposes. 
'" £avnent TO MCK F n m „ „ r i n 1 
Bethers shall be responsible for and
 hol<s „,„,.„ ^ 
indenniry Custo. Crushing the outstanding balance due and
 w V ..«,. 
Sneering
 for its strvic., in S M f c i n g ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
sand and gravel operation on the Property fro,
 S u m m i t C o u n t y a n d £n 
seekinc and ohfAini^ T 
obtaining lend use approval fron, the Town of Francis. 
S
- Operation and r><zi u,~ry 
Bothers shall have no right to operate any sand and „,,,, 
operate on the Property, and has expressly assigned „..'
 SJch 
»9ht to Custom crushing. Delivery of product to Bethers shall
 b e 
»ei9hed and loaded at the Property in the same method as d „ i v e r y 
t 0 a
" Purch«ers of product from the Property. 
9. Execution of Documents 
The parties agree to timely execute and deliver all deeds 
and other documents necessary to effectuate the terms herec:. 
10. Binding 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs, agents/ personal 
representatives, successors and assigns. 
11. Paragraph Numbers and Headings 
The paragraph and subparagraph headings and numbers used 
herein are for purposes of convenience only and shall not be 
considered in the interpretation of this Agreement. 
12. Full Agreement 
This Agreement contains the full agreement of the 
parties, and there are no other agreements, verbal or otherwise. 
13. Modification in Writing 
This Agreement may only be modified or changed cy a 
writing signed by both parties. 
Hade and entered into as of the cay and year first above 
written. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Ray Bethers t h i s ^ 
day of May, 1995. 
Notary Public 
5
 I fflSSfa ,ow!Ss&«c 
1
 StieoiuSh I 
CUSTOM CRUSHING, INC 
Steve Zab_ 
Its Presiden 
SUBSCRIBED *,„ SW0RH t o b e f o r e n e b y £ t £ v e ^ ^ 
P«.xd.„t.
 C u s t o m Crushing_ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^JCCRYSTALAVEgruriiiM ' 
PS>E:\CUSTOMCR\OPTIO.V.ASS 
Notary Public /J 
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in obtaining necessary approvals for the operation of the gravel pit. Fitzgeralds shall be 
responsible to provide water for the gravel pit operation as set forth herein, and shall use their 
best efforts to obtain approval from the State Engineer for such use of their water rights. 
4. Obligations of Custom Crushing 
Custom Crushing shall operate the gravel pit on the Property under the terms and 
conditions of the Conditional Use Permit and other applicable state and federal law. If, despite 
the pending litigation, Custom Crushing is able to begin operation of the gravel pit and produce 
Product, Custom Crushing shall be responsible for twenty-five percent of the cost of reclaiming 
the pit area, beyond the obligations of Custom Crushing which it assumed under the Ray Bethers 
Agreement, according to the reclamation plan prepared by MCM Engineering, and approved by 
the Town of Francis for each year Custom Crushing operates the gravel pit (i.e., Custom 
Crushing shall be responsible for the cost of reclamation as follows: 1st year - 25 %, 2nd year -
50%, 3rd year - 75%, 4th year -100%). After four years of operation, Custom Crushing shall 
be responsible for one hundred percent of the cost of reclamation. If reclamation is required 
before the expiration of the four-year period, Custom Crushing shall make available any on-site 
equipment it has for reclamation at its cost. 
5. Timing of Payment and Inspection of Records 
Custom Crushing shall pay Fitzgeralds the twenty-six cents (26C) per ton royalty 
set forth in Paragraph 1 monthly within fifteen days of the end of each month. Fitzgeralds shall 
have the right to inspect, upon reasonable notice, the records of Custom Crushing as to tonnages 
produced and payments received by Custom Crushing. 
9708.CU781.1 - 3 . 
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The parties aoree to timely execute and deliver aJJ de^c 
documents necessary to efC ' ^ ^ ^  0 t h e ' 
- s s a r v to effectuate the tenns hereof and to operate the
 g r a v e l p i , 
' • Insuranr/* 
Custom Crushing
 s h a l l h o l d h a n n ] e s s M d . 
rr——"—- •——-».»» r: 
o»w;r . policy, and shall be eiven a 
Certificate of Insurance. £ 
8- Binding 
™ « Agreement * * be binding
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 of r
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 M d sha]1 „ o t b e 
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10. Water 
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£i<tvci pit operation. Fitzgeralds shall have the right to use any water not used in the gravel pit 
operation. 
11. Default 
If either party defaults, the non-defaulting party shall give the other written notice 
of the default and a thirty-day period to cure. If the defaulting party fails, to cure within the 
thirty-day period, the non-defaulting party may bring an action in court to seek damages or 
equitable relief. The prevailing party shall be entitled to its reasonable expenses, including 
attorneys fees incurred, 
12. Full Agreement 
This Agreement contains the full agreement of the parties, and there are no other 
agreements, verbal or otherwise. 
13. Assignment 
Custom Crushing shall only assign its rights under this Agreement to another 
person or entity that is ready, willing and able to operate the gravel pit. 
14* Scale? 
Custom Crushing shall abide by all state, federal and local laws requiring the 
certification of its scales, and upon request will provide proof of such certification to 
Fitzgeralds. 
15, Modification in Writing 
This Agreement may only be modified or changed by a writing -signed by both 
>arties. 
?08.CU78i.l - 5 -
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Made and entered into as of the day and year first above written. 
$f f^2c^S/ 
DONHTZG; 
1995. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Don Fitzgerald this J £ ^ a a y of June, ((f^H 
Notary Public 
«9 UA C M * * * * * #ltet 
1995. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Norma Fitzgerald this C!> oay of June, 
Notify Public • U 
I M U t 
M Lata C*y. lhW< (4111 
Uy Conunktlon Explr*t 
S T * ' : • " :•* " 
39708.CU781.1 
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STEVEN FITZG 
J 995 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Steven Fit;* , e r a l d t h i s ^ y a y o f J u n e ) 
Notiry P u b l i c ^ n 3 
CUSTOM CRVsl 
4ia 
i*y r<x—lttriMu ea^ft 
STATE OF UTAI/ 
witha* and foregoing L,stn:mem u « ^ f I Z i % £ T ^ ^ ^ ^ * * * e 
resolution of its board of directors and said Steve t b r i s H ^ T ^ b* a u t h o r i * of a 
e o n * * * * e x i t e d the s ^ c and « * * ^ J ^ ** 
Notary Public "-^~^^MU. 
JTATE OF l^JJj 
3?70J CU7J1 1 
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